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ABSTRACT 
 Corporate governance is the system by which corporations are controlled.  External 
sources of governance include regulatory and market mechanisms as well as the interplay of 
goals between managers, the board, and shareholders.  Other external sources can include 
informal institutions which can shape goals as well as suggested by institutional theory, 
effectively constrain human behavior.  In my first essay, I argue that foreign direct investors can 
act as agents of change in corporate governance.  Investigating changes in ownership and control 
of Swedish firms, I find that active foreign investors’ participation move firms away from a 
Swedish stakeholder orientation toward an Anglo-American shareholder wealth maximization 
focus.  In my second essay, I explore the relationship of informal and formal institutions on 
microfinance institutions (MFI).  Investigating the outreach and performance of MFIs in 
developing nations, I find that strong formal institutions foster better efficiency and outreach 
while strong informal institutions’ impact is limited to better outreach.  In my third essay, I 
investigate the apparent lack of market discipline in the bank subordinated debt market leading 
up to the 2008 finance crisis. I find that subordinated debt holders were caught off guard by the 
suddenness and magnitude of the crisis. I argue that bank opacity created a vulnerable 
environment in the banking industry that contributed to this collapse. 
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OVERALL INTRODUCTION 
 Principle-agent problem deals with the difficulty in persuading one party, the agent, to act 
on the behalf of another party, the principle.  In the corporate structure, the principle-agent 
problem is the misalignment of goals between corporate managers (agent) and shareholders 
(principle).  The primary goal of shareholders is wealth maximization or profit maximization. 
The goals of managers on the other hand can be varied and not always fall in line with profit 
maximization. Managers can pursue projects for private benefits at the expense of overall 
corporate performance. Even without obvious divergence in motivation, managers and owners 
can differ on how to achieve a common goal. 
 The field of corporate governance is concerned with how corporations are controlled.  
There are multiple layers of corporate governance. Within the corporation, corporate governance 
has to do with how effectively the top management team (TMT) controls other agents within the 
corporation, for example subsidiary managers.  Often if there is a conflict within the corporation, 
it is termed agent-agent problem.  This area of corporate governance has gained more interest 
amongst academia in management and international business as corporations continue to become 
more complex organizations in part due to growth in global business.  The main area of 
corporate governance still addresses the conflict between managers of a company and its 
shareholders.  Both of these areas of corporate governance have to do with problems and 
possible solutions within the corporation and between the corporation and its own shareholders.  
There is extensive literature in finance and management that deals with this area.  Beyond this, 
external sources of governance include regulatory and market mechanisms as well as the external 
market for control.  Other external sources can include informal institutions which can shape 
goals as well as suggested by institutional theory, effectively constrain human behavior.  In this 
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thesis, I explore different external sources of corporate governance and their impact on 
managerial behavior.  Beyond corporate takeover literature, this area of inquiry is still relatively 
underdeveloped in the field of finance.  
 In my first essay, I explore the introduction of foreign shareholders primarily from the 
United States and the United Kingdom to Sweden.  I argue that foreigners can act as agents of 
change because they are not bound by informal institutional constraints of the host country.  
Informal institutions not only set the rules of the game but also what are desirable goals for 
corporations. Foreigners will bring with them different goals and different methods of reaching 
their goals that are embedded in their native cultural context.  In my second essay, I explore the 
relationship of informal and formal institutions on microfinance institutions (MFI).  By looking 
across many developing nations and studying relatively similar business types, I can distinguish 
the impact various institutional pillars has on a MFI’s outreach and performance.  In my third 
essay, I investigate the lack of market discipline in the banking industry.  I identify opacity as a 
primary reason why market participants did not or could not effectively discipline banks for 
increased risky behavior. 
 These three essays together explore various sources of external sources of corporate 
governance. The three essays also look at corporate governance from three distinct areas of 
study. The first essay is based on culture which is more common in the field of international 
business and international management. The second essay is based on institutional theory which 
is more common in the field of strategy and corporate finance. The third essay explores market 
discipline which is especially important in banking literature. This wide array of prospective 
allows me to explore the “big picture” of corporate governance. 
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1.   Foreign Direct Investors as Change Agents 
  
   Abstract 
 
 Institutional theory suggests that informal institutions effectively constrain human behavior. 
Culturally embedded norms and values align corporate governance with socially acceptable 
outcomes. We argue that foreign direct investors can act as agents of change in corporate 
governance. Investigating changes in ownership and control of Swedish firms, we find that 
foreign direct investors’ participation in conjunction with a reduction of control by the largest 
domestic shareholder improves firm performance through more efficient capital utilization and 
labor productivity as firms move away from a Swedish stakeholder orientation toward an Anglo-
American shareholder wealth maximization focus.  
 
Keywords: Foreign Direct Investors; Informal Institution; Business Culture   
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1.1   INTRODUCTION 
 An extensive literature on institutional economics establishes a causal link between a 
country’s formal institutions and its economic success (North, 1990; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1998, 2000; Botero, Djankov, La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes, 2004; 
Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 2002; Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001). A well-
functioning legal system that protects private property rights and reduces transaction costs in 
arms-length exchanges, as well as investor protection laws that enable capital to flow from those 
who have it to those who need it, supports the birth and expansion of innovative firms (Wurgler, 
2000; Beck, Levine and Loayza, 2000; Henrekson and Johansson 2009; Johansson, 2010). 
Disclosure and fraud deterrence encourage broad equity market participation by external 
investors and informed price discovery improves capital allocation to the most productive firms 
(Morck, Yeung, and Yu, 2000).  
 But as North (1990) notes, “informal institutions” can play an equally important role. The 
tacit rules of the game – social values, cultural norms, as well as traditions, facilitate 
communication and mutual understanding in societies and establish trust, consensus, and 
national/ethnic identity among strangers. Informal constraints on behavior, which may not 
appear in the form of legal statutes and violations thereof may not result in specific monetary or 
criminal penalties, can nevertheless effectively shape ad influence economic conduct and 
performance.
1
  
 In this paper, we make the case that foreign investors are not as deeply invested in 
maintaining the status quo of local host countries and can have different priorities, business 
cultures, and practices that reflect their home country’s informal institutions. Cross-border 
                                                          
1
Stulz and Williamson (2003) show that religion and language matters to financial development; 
and Fogel, Lee, and McCumber (2011), that the profitability and outreach of microbanks are 
related to Hofstede’s cultural dimensions. 
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investments can change the informal rules of the game that reorients corporate governance, and 
thereby, impact financial efficiency and firm value. We find that the entry of foreign equity 
investors over the years 1992-2008 surrounding Sweden’s formal admission to the European 
Union in 1995 improved the financial performance of large publicly-traded, owner-controlled 
firms in Sweden.
2
 
 The implications of our significant finding are twofold.  In contrast to prior literature, 
cross-border investments over this distinct 17-year sample period were not motivated by the 
exceptional performance of Swedish firms. On the contrary, the notable decline in per capita 
GDP and standard of living of Sweden relative to OECD countries in the two decades following 
its peak in the early 1970s reflected the underperformance of Swedish firms. Moreover, a 
significant mean reversion in the performance of Swedish firms during this sample period – 
utilizing return on assets, return on equity, and earnings per share as proxies, is inconsistent with 
momentum driven, return-chasing behavior by foreign investors.  
 Importantly, we also show that the improved performance of Swedish firms was not 
simply a result of cross-border portfolio investments by institutions as the literature on 
shareholder activism implies. Gillan and Starks (2003) find that foreign institutional investors 
play an important role in monitoring management and prompting change in corporate 
governance practices worldwide; Ferreira and Matos (2008), that foreign institutional ownership 
is positively correlated with the value and performance of firms outside of the United States; and 
Aggarwal, Erel, Ferreira and Matos (2010), that foreign investors are able to change corporate 
governance mechanisms and outcomes. These studies, however, must contend with a significant 
                                                          
2
The last step of deregulation of Swedish capital market was in 1989, which removed foreign 
ownership restrictions in Swedish firms. However, foreign participation was minimal and grew 
slowly until just prior to Sweden’s entry into the European Union. 
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endogeneity issue.
3
 Appropriate inferences about the impact of cross-border investments by 
foreigners on firm performance will require adequate controls for self-selection bias – the 
incentive of foreigners to concentrate their investments in high performing firms. 
 Our research design avoids the endogeneity issue entirely. Foreign equity investors in 
Swedish firms over this 17-year sample period were predominantly institutional. Significant 
improvements in firm performance occurred only when there was an increase in participation by 
foreign direct investors coincident with a decrease in the excess voting power of the largest 
domestic shareholder that gives foreign equity investors a critical “voice” in the management of 
the firm. Neither an increase in foreign participation nor a decrease in excess voting power of the 
largest domestic shareholder alone was sufficient. Further, we find that the participation of 
control-seeking domestic equity investors did not appear to have the same effect. There was no 
significant change in firm performance from declines in the excess voting power of the largest 
domestic shareholder that resulted from an increase in participation by control-seeking domestic 
investors. Only foreign direct equity investors, primarily from the United States and the United 
Kingdom, can assume leading roles as change agents in reducing the unproductive deployment 
of capital and labor. 
 Sweden is an ideal setting to investigate the impact that cross-border investments have on 
domestic firms because the absence of regulatory restrictions on pyramid structures and the 
issuance of dual class shares allows for considerably large differences in the distribution of 
ownership and voting rights among equity shareholders. It is possible for equity investors to have 
majority control rights with minimal ownership stakes. Table 1.1 shows that Sweden saw a 
dramatic increase in foreign ownership and voting participation from the early 1990’s through 
                                                          
3
Adams, Hermalin and Weisback (2010) point out the endemic nature of endogeneity in the 
corporate governance literature. 
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2008. Over the 17-year sample period 1992-2008, there was a decline in the percentage of 
ownership and voting rights, and as a result, the excess voting power of the largest domestic 
shareholder. The use of dual class shares by Swedish firms concurrently fell as well.  
[Insert Table 1.1 about here.] 
 It is also apparent from Table 1.1 that the large influx of foreigners stimulated higher 
GDP growth and a rise in overall market capitalization and equity share issuance. Improvements 
in individual firm performance from the entry of foreign direct equity investors starting in 1992, 
which preceded the admission of Sweden into the European Union in 1995, had a positive long-
term effect on the overall economy. The reversal in Sweden’s economic performance since 1992 
is significant. Until the early 1970’s, Sweden’s economic performance was stellar. Sweden 
ranked 5
th
 among OECD countries in standard of living. But in the two decades that followed, 
Sweden’s relative economic performance deteriorated. The McKinsey Global Institute (1995) 
“Sweden’s Economic Performance” report notes that by 1990, Sweden’s GDP per capita was 
surpassed by Germany, France and Japan; and by 1993, surpassed by Italy and the United 
Kingdom, following the 1990-1993 Swedish economic recession. 
 The prolonged decline in standard of living, some argue, was primarily due to a fall in 
labor productivity. Hansson and Lundberg (1991) find that Sweden’s total factor productivity 
growth over the 1970-1985 period was the lowest among OECD countries. Others argue that the 
economic decline was caused by a lack of economic evolution or entrepreneurship. Low levels of 
innovation, defined as new or substantially improved products, services or production processes 
and productivity growth, are important factors in economic evolution. For economic evolution to 
progress, the environment must encourage job creation and destruction. Inflexibility in labor 
markets hampers this need (Botero, et al., 2004). Family control and ownership concentration, 
both salient features in Sweden (Henrekson and Jakobsson, 2003), are correlated with lower rates 
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of downsizing (Jackson 2005) and lower growth rates (Bjuggren, Daunfeldt, and Johansson 
2010). Sako and Jackson (2006) find that the ability of strong labor unions in Sweden to 
mobilize support, and as a result, exert greater power in the bargaining process creates job 
security. In addition, a number of institutional changes in credit market regulations, taxes, labor 
market legislation and access to product markets instituted after World War II provided poor 
incentives for entrepreneurship (Johansson 2008)
4
. 
 In contrast to prior studies that primarily center on formal institutions, and in particular, 
how the worldwide spread in shareholder protection laws improves corporate governance 
(Aggarwal, et al., 2010), focus on Sweden affords a natural experiment for examining the impact 
of informal institutions on firm performance. Informal institutions influence corporate 
governance by aligning corporate goals with socially acceptable outcomes. Owners and 
controlling shareholders of large corporations are heavily vested in and abide by local values and 
ideals. Such values constrain corporate governance choices. Anglo-American corporations take a 
shareholder orientation that places efficiency above welfare, but in German and Japanese 
corporations, they take a stakeholder orientation that places common interests ahead of financial 
performance (Dore, 2000). 
 Culturally embedded corporate governance practices cannot be easily displaced even 
when the gains in economic efficiency are large. Corporate owners stand to benefit from the 
maintenance of the status quo and may not welcome radical changes that can lead to “creative 
destruction” of their market power and political dominance. Furthermore, all possible successors 
of culturally entrenched owners, particularly in closed economies, may share similar traditions 
                                                          
4Henrekson (2005) directly points out that “an entrepreneurial culture and a welfare state are 
very remotely related. As a result, the respective cultures are unlikely to be promoted by a 
similar set of institutions”. 
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and beliefs. A nonconformist can face intense social ostracism.  
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. A brief introduction to the role of 
institutions is presented in the next section along with important characteristics of Swedish 
institutions. Section 1.3 describes the data and variable construction. Section 1.4 presents the 
empirical results and interpretations. Concluding remarks are in Section 1.5. 
1.2   INSTITUTIONS AND FOREIGNERS 
1.2.1   Institutions and the Role of Foreign Investors 
 The special role of foreign direct investors as unique change agents for improving 
corporate governance is rooted in the role of institutions. “Institutions are the rules of the game 
in a society” that constrain human behavior (North, 1989; 1990). Formal institutions are the 
written laws and regulations that define a country’s legal system and regulatory environment. 
The enforcement, adjudication, and assessment of civil and criminal penalties are clearly 
specified. Informal institutions are the unwritten values, beliefs, customs and traditions that 
define a country’s culture and code of conduct. Enforcement is self-policing in nature and 
penalties take the form of public rebuke and ostracism.   
 Formal institutions can change. Laws and regulations can be supplemented, modified, or 
eliminated. Because a lengthy political and legislative process is involved, changes in formal 
institutions are episodic. There can be long periods of stagnancy, and very often, the catalyst is a 
response to a significant external shock. In contrast, changes in informal institutions are 
intergenerational and evolve slowly. Values, beliefs, customs and traditions represent tacit 
knowledge that requires time to digest, update, and become embedded as a societal norm. It is far 
easier to effect a legislative change in law than a change in culture. 
 In making cross-border investments, foreign investors recognize and adapt to the formal 
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institutions of the host country. The likelihood of detection and severity of punishment for legal 
infringements are easy to understand. Differences in societal cultures between home and host 
countries are another matter. Foreign investors may not be fully aware of local customs and 
traditions nor view these customs and traditions with the same affinity or attachment. Moreover, 
the benefits from conformity to customs and traditions may be private, that is, are unique to 
locals and may not accrue to outsiders because of their foreignness. Lastly, the societal penalty 
for breaching an informal rule of conduct can be perceived differently by a foreigner than by a 
local. In China the concept of saving or losing “face” is an integral part of the national psyche. 
To lose face is to subject oneself and familial relations to intense humiliation that is to be 
avoided at all costs. But for a foreigner, the threat of societal chastisement may be viewed as no 
more than an inconvenience and embarrassment.  
 Foreigners are not only more likely to be unaware of or lack appreciation for local 
customs and traditions, but are also less susceptible to societal pressures for conformity to 
societal norms of conduct. More importantly, only foreign direct investors have the potential to 
effectively act as agents of change and an interest in acquiring control rights. Foreign portfolio 
investors will focus instead on the ownership rights to cash flows from monetary investments 
and have no interest in challenging the institutions of the host country. Domestic investors, who 
are already in privileged societal positions, are also unlikely to undertake institutional changes 
that place their favored positions in jeopardy. 
1.2.2   Swedish Institutions 
 The first democratically elected socialist government took power in Sweden in 1920, and 
since then, the country is viewed as an exemplary model of the social welfare state. Lindbeck 
(1997), describes Swedish Corporatism as disciplined cooperation between labor and entrenched 
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owners of capital that harks back to the “Saltsjöbaden Agreement” of 1938 between the Swedish 
Confederation of Trade Unions (LO) and the Swedish Employers’ Confederation (SAF). Further, 
Hogfeldt (2005) points out that the Social Democratic Party (SAP) cooperated with both the LO 
and SAF. Moreover, unlike most other countries in Europe, Sweden’s neutrality in two world 
wars allowed a sufficiently long period of stability during which Social Capitalism attained 
“cognitively based legitimacy” (Suchman, 1995), and thereby, the relative permanence of its 
institutions. However, there was some change in the relationship between the SAP, LO and SAF. 
After World War II, the ties between the SAP and LO strengthened, making labor much stronger 
in its dealings with SAF. From the late 1970’s through early 1980’s, relations between LO and 
SAF (Lindbeck, 1997) deteriorated which led to a decline in the Swedish economy. 
 Many scholars  Jackson and Deeg (2008), Jacoby (2005), Dore (2000), Hall and Sockice 
(2001), Hollingsworth, Schmitter, and Streeck (1994), Streeck (2001), Whitley (1992), argue that 
capitalism can take forms that go beyond the shareholder focused, market oriented Anglo-
American norm. In coordinated economies such as Sweden, the corporate governance model 
seeks to align the differing interests of labor, capital owners, and the state. By achieving a 
political consensus between labor and major capital owners
5
, proponents of the Swedish model 
describe the governance structure as promoting strong private ownership that embraces a long-
term point of view and accepts a social responsibility towards employees and society in general 
(Agnblad, Berglof, Hogfeldt and Svancar, 2001).   
 Further, an important aspect of Swedish corporate governance is the reliance on informal 
enforcement mechanisms with considerable discretion exercised by controlling shareholders. 
Concerns over reputation and social status limit the abuse of minority shareholders. In Sweden, 
                                                          
5
Private ownership represented primarily institutional owners like tax exempted pension funds 
and founding family funds rather than private individuals.  
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social prestige is a significant private benefit associated with the control of large corporations. 
Families own many of the large Swedish firms. These families have built long term relationships 
with employees, bankers and suppliers based on trust (Poza 2007). 
 Corporate law explicitly favors firms with strong majority control and enables private 
owners to establish and maintain control of listed firms through pyramidal ownership structures 
and dual class shares. For example, in 1997, Ericsson had Class A shares with a 1000:1 vote 
differential to Class B shares. As a consequence, the largest domestic shareholder had a 4.9% 
ownership stake but 43.4% of the voting rights. In stark comparison, foreign investors in 
Ericsson represented 51.5% of the ownership but only 1.4% of the voting rights. Moreover, the 
true degree of disparity between ownership and control rights of the largest domestic owner may 
be understated when the pyramid structure to which Ericsson belongs is considered.  
 As shown by La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer (1999), concentrated control 
(ownership) is common in most countries but Sweden appears to be an extreme case. Many other 
countries, especially in Europe, allow similar ownership structures. But few countries permit 
both pyramid structures and vote-differentiated dual class shares. Moreover, even among 
countries that allow dual class shares, the proportion of firms that use dual class shares is higher 
in Sweden than any other country in Europe. 
 Based on measures proposed by La Porta et al. (1998, 2000), Sweden is a country that 
provides relatively poor minority shareholder protection compared to Anglo-Saxon countries. 
However, Swedish institutions effectively protect the interests of minority shareholders. Agnblad 
et al. (2001) note the absence of evidence that minority shareholders in Sweden are exploited. 
The deficiency in formal laws that protect minority shareholders is more than offset by high 
standards of legal enforcement and accounting. La Porta et al. (1998, 2000) rank Sweden far 
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above other countries on rule-of-law; and Durnev, Errunza, and Molchanov (2009), rank 
Sweden’s transparency 5th out of 69 countries in their study.  
 In civil law countries like Sweden, changes in formal statutes that protect minority 
shareholders, involve a political and legislative process that foreign investors are unlikely to 
initiate. Any improvements in corporate governance will more likely come from informal 
changes in managerial conduct advanced by foreign investors toward shareholder maximization. 
But demands for change in Swedish firms can be ignored by well protected, controlling domestic 
owners. Foreign direct investors will be successful in effecting such changes only when the 
controlling domestic owner is willing to relinquish some of his voting control. But when such 
changes are successful, there can be observable improvements in firm performance.  
 Lastly, Carlsson (2007) contends that the Swedish system of corporate governance 
minimizes the principal-agent problem because it allows a shareholder to obtain the requisite 
votes to effectively control management at a lower cost than when the property and voting rights 
of stock ownership are equalized. Boubakri, Cosset, and Guedhami (2005) find ownership 
concentration has a positive impact on post-privatization firm performance. However, even when 
management acts in the best interests of a minority shareholder with majority voting rights, there 
is an implied assumption that the interests of the shareholders with majority voting rights are 
aligned with the interests of other shareholders. 
 As Berle and Means (1932) and Jensen and Meckling (1976) make clear, the incentive 
misalignment from separating property and voting rights potentially worsens the agency 
problem. The negative effect of separating ownership and control is corroborated by Bjuggren, 
Eklund, and Wiberg (2007). With vote-differentiated shares, the market for corporate control is 
less effective in resolving conflicts of interests between majority and minority shareholders. 
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Similarly, Cronqvist and Nilsson (2003) document a value discount when a minority shareholder 
is in control. To the extent foreign investors can decrease excess voting power exercised by the 
largest domestic shareholder, the performance of Swedish firms should improve.  
 Deregulation of capital markets during the 1980’s, finalized in 1989, and subsequent 
external public pressure on Sweden to join the European Union in the early 1990’s, was an 
exogenous catalyst that led to an influx of foreign investors. Over our study period 1992-2008, 
foreign investors were predominantly from the United States and United Kingdom – an overall 
average of 40% and 14% and at the peak in 2000 52% and 24% respectively of all foreign 
investors.
6
 These Anglo-American foreign investors, who sought an active role, posed a 
challenge to Swedish corporate governance.
7
 Foreign direct investors will demand managerial 
performance consistent with shareholder-oriented capitalism (Errunza, 2001).  
1.3   EMPIRICAL DESIGN 
1.3.1   Data Sources 
 The details of ownership and voting rights
8
 on Swedish firms was obtained from annual 
publications of SIS ÄGARSERVICE AB’s Owners and Power in Sweden’s Listed Companies, 
which over the 1992 to 2008 sample period covered all companies listed on the Stockholm Stock 
Exchange and the NGM Exchange. This data does not contain companies listed on the 
Stockholm Stock Exchange that are domiciled abroad. The publications assemble and track 
corporate identities and name changes as well as ownership and voting percentages of the largest 
                                                          
6
In contrast, Denmark, Holland, and Norway represented 3.3%, 2%, and 4.8% respectively. 
Finland represented 12.9% as the third largest foreign investors.  
7
The conflict of interest between foreign direct investors and the interests of Sweden’s system is 
similar to the conflict between foreign investors and local governments described by Henisz and 
Zelner (2005). 
8
In a dual class stock structure, all shares confer the same ownership rights but Class A shares 
have superior voting rights to Class B shares.  
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domestic shareholders, foreign equity shareholders, and up to a total of 25 largest shareholders. 
On average, these shareholders represent 80.6% of the vote in all listed companies and 84.2% in 
dual class issuing companies.  
 There are five primary sources of information used to construct the Owners and Power 
dataset. These include: (i) two different documents from VPC AB and Swedish Securities 
Register Centre that are the Public Shareholders’ Register and Register of Nominee 
Shareholders; (ii) the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority’s regularly published “flag up” 
or “flag down” disclosures;9 (iii) required disclosures to the Swedish Financial Supervisory 
Authority of changes in large block private individuals who either own more than 200 shares or 
whose shares have a market value of at least SEK 50,000; (iv) SIS ÄGARSERVICE AB’s 
proprietary data; and (v) voluntary disclosures by shareholders themselves. 
  Firm characteristics as well as accounting data were obtained from Compustat Global 
over the sample period. Data were merged manually because the only identifier that could be 
used, company name, was not always consistently recorded in the same manner and changes 
over time were not always reflected. The fact that many of the names are in Swedish and often 
abbreviated complicated matters. 
1.3.2   Hypothesis 
 In a prior study, Dahlquist and Robertsson (2004) observe a positive correlation between 
foreign ownership and firm performance. Foreigners invest in firms with strong recent 
performance. The resulting increase in the proportion of foreign ownership lowers the cost of 
equity. In theory, firm performance is enhanced because a lower cost of capital allows firms to 
undertake more positive net present value (NPV) projects. The causal link between foreign 
                                                          
9The “flag up” or “flag down” disclosure happens when an owner moves between the following 
levels of ownership or votes: 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 50, 66.67, and 90 percent. 
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ownership and improved firm performance is, however, unclear. Investing in firms with an 
established record of strong performance seems to suggest that foreigners chase “winners”. 
Further, a reduction in cost of equity from higher equity valuations may simply be a byproduct of 
portfolio investments by foreigners in informationally inefficient local equity markets. To 
establish a causal link between foreign participation and firm performance, it is critically 
important to distinguish between “direct” and “portfolio” foreign investors in Swedish firms 
based on their relative interest in property and voting rights, which Manne (1965) and Marris 
(1964) point out, are both attached to equity ownership.  
 Specifically, we examine the Hirschman (1970) Hypothesis. Portfolio investors are 
primarily interested in the cash distributions and contingent claim values associated with 
property rights. For portfolio investors, concern with firm performance is short-term and limited 
to assessments of its impact on the potential returns from equity ownership. When realized 
returns fail to meet expectations, foreign portfolio investors will tend to liquidate their 
investments and reinvest the proceeds in other firms. Because foreign portfolio investors are 
most likely to invest in well performing firms, only domestic investors (e.g., founder families), 
who can have other incentives for equity ownership, are apt to show loyalty and retain equity 
ownership when firm performance is poor.   
 In contrast, foreign direct investors take a long-term view of the potential benefits of 
equity ownership and are more interested in improving firm performance by influencing 
corporate governance that comes from the exercise of voting rights. As Bjuggren and Bohman 
(2006) argue, only those with the ability to increase residual income stand to benefit from 
acquiring enough control rights to enforce a value increasing change. Foreign direct investors are 
more prepared and willing to exercise voting rights to affect managerial behavior that leads to 
 17 
 
improved performance. In distinguishing between foreign direct and foreign portfolio investors, 
we explicitly address the paradox of ownership concentration without commitment (Davis, 2008) 
 namely that, institutional owners can have large ownership stakes but will likely prefer a share 
sale exit strategy over an exercise of voting rights to effect a change in corporate governance 
when firm performance does not meet expectations. 
1.3.3   Foreign Portfolio, Foreign Direct, and Control-Seeking Domestic Investor 
Definitions 
 We restrict our sample to firms with Dual Class Shares. This restriction is necessary to 
clearly identify control-seeking foreign equity participation. In Sweden, shares of all classes 
carry the same cashflow rights, i.e., dividend rates, but A shares carry significantly more voting 
rights than B shares or C shares. Concentrated control of A shares by a few large, domestic 
owners further reduces the supply of A shares. Consequently, Class A shares sell at a premium 
price and tend to have lower liquidity. Their acquisition by foreign or domestic investors clearly 
indicates intent to exert control. Over our sample period, firms with dual class shares represent 
between 46% and 84% of all publicly traded firms, with the proportion monotonically declining 
over time. 
 For each firm, we examine the annual changes in foreign and domestic ownership from 
the prior year. Three yearly dummy variables – F-Portfoliot, F-Directt, and CSDt, are used to 
indicate the nature of the changes in foreign and domestic ownership. A firm is categorized as F-
Portfoliot in a particular year when the only change in equity investments are by foreign portfolio 
investors who acquire only class B shares and their ownership changes do not exceed 5%. These 
restrictions ensure that the interests of foreign portfolio investors are purely financial and do not 
stem from the exercise of voting rights. 
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 Firms are categorized as CSDt or F-Directt in a particular year, when the changes in 
equity investments by control-seeking domestic or foreign direct investors are either through the 
acquisition of Class A shares or Class B shares that increase ownership by 5% or more, and the 
changes in equity investments result in a decline in the excess and total voting power of the 
largest domestic shareholder.
10
 Focus is on the largest domestic shareholder as opposed to the 
largest 2, 3, 5, or other arbitrary number of domestic shareholders, for two reasons. First, the 
largest domestic shareholder exercised (on average) over 50% to 29% respectively, of the votes 
from the beginning to the end of the sample period 1992 to 2008. Second, as La Porta et al. 
(1999) point out, 20% is sufficient for one shareholder to effectively control the company. 
 Because the holdings of Class A shares are concentrated among a few parties, the 
acquisition of a sufficiently large number of Class B shares in open markets can also be a 
substitute. Requiring a reduction in total voting power ensures that the largest domestic 
shareholders do not make compensating changes in loss of control from the sale of Class A 
shares through the purchase of Class B shares. In other words, it is unambiguous that the largest 
domestic shareholder voluntarily relinquished some control to other control-seeking investors. 
 We denote D1–Vote and F–Vote as the percentages of voting rights exercised by the 
largest domestic shareholder and the aggregate of all foreign investors respectively; and D1–
Capital and F–Capital, as the ownership percentages of the largest domestic shareholder and the 
aggregate of all foreign investors, respectively. Excess Vote is the difference between the 
                                                          
10
Our definition of foreign direct and foreign portfolio investor should not be confused with the 
OECD definition of foreign direct investments. Although conceptually very similar, our 
threshold is 5% voting control while the OECD definition is 10%. More importantly, because of 
the high use of dual class shares by Swedish firms as well as the dominant control that can be 
exerted by the largest domestic shareholder, we also add a requirement that the largest domestic 
shareholder must relinquish some control. It is possible, though doubtful, that a foreign portfolio 
investor will choose to accumulate more than 10% voting power slowly over time.  
 19 
 
ownership and voting percentages of the largest domestic shareholder.   
1.3.4   Summary Statistics 
 We use three proxies of profitability to capture firm performance. ROAt, ROEt, and EPSt, 
are defined as: Net Incomet divided by Average Total Assetst-1,t, Average Shareholders Equityt-1,t 
and Average Numbers of Shares Outstandingt-1,t, respectively; and future one-year changes in 
firm performance ΔROAt,t+1, ΔROEt,t+1, and ΔEPSt,t+1 as ROAt+1 – ROAt, ROEt+1 – ROEt, and 
EPSt+1 – EPSt, respectively. The number of employees is used as a surrogate for Sizet of firm. 
We use Average Plant, Property, and Equipmentt-1,t and Net Revenuet divided by Average 
Number of Emplyeest-1,t as proxies for Capital Intensityt and Labor Productivityt, respectively, 
and future changes, ΔCapital Intensityt,t+1 and ΔLabor Productivityt,t+1, as Capital Intensityt+1 – 
Capital Intensityt and Labor Productivityt+1 – Labor Productivityt, respectively. 
[Insert Table 1.2 about here.] 
 Table 1.2 reports summary statistics on the variables used in this study.
11
 On average, 
Swedish firms are profitable and profitability increased over the sample period. Approximately 
23% and 31% respectively, of the firm-year changes in equity ownership involved foreign direct 
and foreign portfolio investors; 16%, involved control-seeking domestic investors; and in the 
remaining 30%, there was either no change in foreign ownership or the change in ownership 
involved domestic portfolio investors. On average, Swedish firms employed almost 9,400 
workers and the average excess vote of the largest domestic shareholder was 17.32%. 
1.4   EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
1.4.1   Univariate Analysis 
 Table 1.3 is divided into two panels. Panel A reports the bivariate correlations between 
changes in firm performance or productivity (dependent variables) and level of performance, 
                                                          
11
Data values were winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels to remove outliers. 
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ownership, voting rights and size of the firm (independent variables). The negative correlations 
between firm performance and future changes in performance respectively, of -0.4825, -0.7172, 
and -0.6654, indicate mean-reversions in firm performance that are statistically significant at the 
0.1% level. Moreover, the positive correlations between current productivity and future changes 
in productivity respectively, of 0.5189 and 0.4187, that are statistically significant at the 0.1% 
level, imply a positive trend in firm productivity. Lastly, participation by foreign direct investors 
have significant positive correlations with future changes in firm performance, and foreign 
portfolio investors have a negative but not always significant correlation with future changes in 
performance. The correlation between increased participation by control-seeking domestic 
investors and changes in performance is negative though insignificant.  
[Insert Table 1.3 about here.] 
 Panel B shows that all three alternative measures of performance and both measures of 
productivity are positively correlated and significant at the 1% level or higher. In addition, the 
significant positive correlations between foreign portfolio investors and firm performance 
respectively, of 0.1059, 0.0565, and 0.0826, confirm that portfolio investors are attracted to well 
performing firms.  
 This is not true of foreign direct investors. The negative correlations respectively, of -
0.0293 and -0.0648 between foreign direct investors and productivity, suggest that foreign direct 
investors are attracted to firms with low productivity because of potential improvement. The 
correlation of firm size with current performance is significantly positive. But as evident in Panel 
A, the relationship between size and future changes in performance is insignificant. Lastly, firms 
dominated by a large domestic shareholder attract foreign portfolio investors but deter foreign 
direct and control-seeking domestic investors. The positive correlation between the excess vote 
of the largest domestic shareholder and participation of foreign portfolio investors of 0.0920, and 
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negative correlations between the excess vote of the largest domestic shareholder and 
participation of foreign direct and control-seeking domestic investors respectively, of -0.0639 
and -0.0901, are highly significant.   
1.4.2   Multivariate Analysis 
 Two-way fixed effects regressions, Yt+1 = Xbt + et, that control for both firm specific 
characteristics and time are used to assess whether changes in equity investments by foreign 
direct investors increase firm performance in the subsequent period. The dependent variable, 
Yt+1: Performancet+1 – Performancet, utilizes ROAt, ROEt, and EPSt as surrogates for firm 
performance. The explanatory variables, Xt, are:  (i) current change in ownership reflected by the 
categorical dummy variables F-Portfoliot, F-Directt, and CSDt; (ii) number of employees to 
capture Sizet;
12
 (iii) current year performance; and (iv) excess voting power of the largest 
domestic shareholder in the current year; and (v) capital ownership of foreign direct and foreign 
portfolio investors for the current year. The change in the subsequent three-year average return 
from the current year is used to examine the long-term impact of the foreign direct investors.
13
 
 The results in Table 1.4 indicate that only F-Directt, namely, changes in equity 
investments by foreign direct investors that reduce the excess voting power of the largest 
domestic shareholder improve firm performance. In model 1, where ΔROAt,t+1 is the change in 
firm performance, we find that F-Directt  has a coefficient of 0.0809 which is significant at the 
0.1% level. In models 2 and 3, where the change in performance are ΔROEt,t+1 and ΔEPSt,t+1 
respectively, the coefficients 0.0845 and 2.9995, are also positive and highly significant. 
                                                          
 
12
Results using Total Assets and log of Total Assets as well as Market Capitalization and log of 
Market Capitalization as alternative proxies for size are similar.  
13
The use of categorical dummy variables of control and ownership along with the use of level 
variables for control and ownership in the same regression is similar to the approach taken by 
Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang (2002). 
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Moreover, increased participation by foreign portfolio and control-seeking domestic investors 
does not significantly improve and may worsen firm performance. The coefficients for F-
Portfoliot are insignificant in models 1 and 2; negative and significant at the 5% level in model 3. 
The coefficients for CSDt are insignificant and positive in models 1 and 2; insignificant and 
negative, in model 3.  
 Further, the positive but insignificant coefficients for F-Direct Capitalt confirms that 
participation by foreign direct investors improves performance but only when there is a 
concomitant decline in the excess voting power of the largest domestic shareholder. Similarly, 
the negative coefficient for F-Portfolio Capitalt, which is statistically significant in model 1 and 
insignificant in models 2 and 3, confirms that increased participation by foreign portfolio 
investors tends to worsen firm performance.  
[Insert Table 1.4 about here.] 
1.4.3   Intensity of Foreign Participation  
 If foreign direct investors improve firm performance, their impact on firm performance 
should be greater the more considerable is their involvement. To investigate this, we partition F-
Directt into three categories. F-Directt 5%, F-Directt 10%, and F-Directt 20% signifies that 
foreign direct investors acquire between 5% and less than 10% of the votes, between 10% and 
less than 20% of the votes, and 20% or more of the votes, respectively. Similarly, we partition F-
Portfoliot into the same three categories. 
 Table 1.5 shows the results of a two-way fixed effects panel regressions controlling for 
firm and year. Foreign portfolio investors do not significantly improve firm performance 
regardless of how much voting control is acquired. Only increased participation of foreign direct 
investors matters. Moreover, the greater is their level of participation, the larger is the positive 
impact on firm performance. The coefficients are positive and larger as the level of participation 
 23 
 
by foreign direct investors increases, F-Directt 20% > F-Directt 10% > F-Directt 5%, and 
significant when participation by foreign direct investors reach the 10% threshold. 
[Insert Table 1.5 about here.] 
1.4.4   Long Term Performance Impact 
 To assess whether the permanence of the improvements in firm performance that result 
from the participation of foreign direct investors, we examine future three-year changes in firm 
performance relative the current firm performance as proxies for long-term firm performance. 
LTROAt,t+3, LTROEt,t+3, and LTEPSt,t+3 are defined as 1/3            
 
   , 
1/3            
 
   , and 1/3            
 
    ,  respectively. Two-way fixed effects 
panel regressions controlling for firm and year are reported in Table 1.6.  
 The results in Tables 1.4 and 1.6 are consistent. On average, foreign direct investors are 
associated with long-term improvements in firm performance. In all three models, the 
coefficients for F-Directt are significantly positive at the 10% level or better. In addition, note 
that the coefficients of F-Portfoliot are always negative; and the coefficient of CSDt, is positive 
in model 1 but negative in models 2 and 3. Though none of the coefficients are significant, the 
participation of foreign portfolio or control-seeking domestic investors, suggests an adverse 
impact on firm performance. 
[Insert Table 1.6 about here.] 
1.4.5   Sources of Efficiency 
 The two-way fixed effects panel regressions controlling for firm and year reported in 
Table 1.7 considers labor productivity and capital intensity as potential sources of efficiency that 
contribute to improvements in firm performance. The dependent variables in columns 1 and 2 are 
the one-year future changes in revenue per employee and capital-labor ratio, and in columns 3 
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and 4, the three-year future changes in revenue per employee and capital-labor ratio. 
[Insert Table 1.7 about here.] 
 The highly significant positive coefficients associated with F-Directt in panel regressions 
1 and 2 clearly show that only the participation of foreign direct investors increases labor 
productivity and capital intensity. The involvement either of foreign portfolio investors or 
control-seeking domestic investors has no impact on labor productivity or capital utilization. 
Firms are more profitable through lower cost from enhanced deployment of labor and capital. 
Moreover, the panel regressions in columns 3 and 4 show the improvements in labor and capital 
efficiency are long-term even after we account for momentum in labor productivity and capital 
intensity. 
 These results are consistent with Bjuggren et al. (2006) and Holmen and Hogfeldt’s 
(2009) finding that the exercise of control by minority owners and pyramid ownership structures 
lead to overinvestment and loss of firm value, as well as with Jackson, Hopner, and 
Kurdelbusch’s (2005) finding, that a change in orientation toward shareholder maximization 
raised the profitability of German firms. Lastly, our results complement Giannetti and Laeven 
(2009) who find that foreign pension funds improve firm performance. Their study, however, 
fails to differentiate between ownership and control. We show that it is voting control rather than 
ownership that enhances firm performance.
14
 
1.4.6   Robustness 
 A decrease in the excess vote of the largest domestic shareholder as a result of foreign 
involvement is not sufficient by itself to improve firm performance. Reductions in excess vote 
                                                          
14
Giannetti and Laeven (2009) examine firms with both single and dual class issues. But in this 
case, the correlation between ownership and vote percentages is high. In contrast, our study has a 
relatively high degree of separation between ownership and vote percentages.  Consequently, we 
can account for both simultaneously and show that the impact of foreign votes on firm 
performance dominates the impact of foreign ownership. 
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must entail a voluntary acquiescence of control by the largest domestic shareholders to foreign 
direct investors. Moreover, participation by control-seeking domestic shareholders is not a 
substitute. Only foreign direct investors can be agents of change. 
 To underscore these points, we examine two panel datasets that focus on firm-years 
where there was a decline in the excess vote of the largest domestic shareholder. In the first 
dataset, declines in the excess vote of the largest domestic shareholder are associated with 
increases in ownership and vote of foreign direct and control-seeking domestic investors. In the 
second dataset, declines in the excess vote of the largest domestic shareholder are associated 
only with increases in ownership and vote of control-seeking domestic investors that more than 
offset decreases in the ownership and vote of foreign direct investors. 
[Insert Table 1.8 about here.] 
 In the panel regressions, the actual decreases in excess vote percentages of the largest 
domestic shareholder are denoted by              
 ; increases and decreases of foreign vote 
percentages by         
  and         
 , respectively; and increases in vote percentages of 
control-seeking domestic investors, by          
 . Interaction terms              
  (X) 
        
 ,              
  (X)         
 , and              
  (X)         
 , reflect 
changes in the excess vote percentage of the largest domestic shareholder associated with 
changes in voting percentages of foreign direct and control-seeking domestic investors. 
 The two-way fixed effects panel regressions controlling for firm and year in Table 1.8 
confirm that a reduction in excess vote as a result of participation by foreign direct or control-
seeking domestic investors is insufficient to improve firm performance. The coefficients 
associated with excess vote and foreign vote are mostly positive but insignificant. Moreover, 
greater participation by control-seeking domestic shareholders tends to lower rather than raise 
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firm performance – coefficients are mostly negative though insignificant. Only when reductions 
in excess vote are accompanied by increases in foreign direct investors’ vote does firm 
performance improve. Coefficients corresponding to these interaction terms are consistently 
positive and significant. These results indicate the critical importance of our classification of 
foreign investors as either direct or portfolio investors. Although not shown, the classification of 
institutional foreign investors does not impact our results. The vast majority of both foreign 
portfolio and foreign direct investors are institutions, and consequently, institutional investor is 
not a characteristic that distinguishes foreign portfolio from foreign direct investors. 
1.5   CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 A reversal in the decline in Swedish GDP per capita began in 1994. Sweden’s GDP per 
capita growth between 1998 and 2004 was the strongest amongst OECD nations. High 
productivity growth was cited as the primary explanation for this positive development by 
McKinsey Global Institute’s report “Sweden’s Economic Performance: Recent Development, 
Current Priorities” (2006). During this period, productivity growth in Sweden’s private sector 
ranked 4
th
 among OECD countries and was 1.5 times higher than the average. Sweden’s 
admission to the EU lowered trade barriers and the influx of foreign owners’ willingness to 
confront labor unions enhanced the competitiveness of Swedish firms. The result was an increase 
in output without a corresponding increase in labor input
15
. The macroeconomic trends are 
consistent with the firm level evidence we find in this study, which shows that improved firm 
performance is associated with higher labor productivity and capital intensity. 
 As institutions theory predicts, foreign direct investors can be agents of change in firms 
controlled by culturally entrenched insiders. Foreign investors reorient corporate governance 
                                                          
15
This is consistent with the view that Sweden’s high-growth firms only modestly contribute to 
job creation (Davidsson and Henrekson 2002). 
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goals without radically changing the formal rules and regulations that govern corporate choice, 
and instead, effect changes in corporate culture by challenging the informal rules of the game. 
Successful change can come only when large domestic shareholders, who are highly entrenched 
and can obstruct change, are willing to relinquish some control rights. Foreign direct investors, 
primarily from the United States and the United Kingdom, induced a shift by Swedish firms 
towards a shareholder orientation that places efficiency above welfare and away from a 
stakeholder orientation that places common interests ahead of financial performance. 
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Table 1.1:  Trend in Ownership and Control of Swedish Firms 
External public pressure on Sweden to join the European Union in the early 1990’s was an 
exogenous catalyst that led to an influx of foreign investors. D1–Vote and F–Vote, are the 
percentages of voting rights exercised by the largest domestic shareholder and the aggregate of 
all foreign investors respectively; and D1–Capital and F–Capital, are the ownership percentages 
of the largest domestic shareholder, the foreign direct investor, and the aggregate of all foreign 
portfolio investors, respectively. Excess Votet is the difference between the ownership and voting 
percentages of the largest domestic shareholder. Average ownership and voting percentages of 
Swedish firms held by foreigners increased from 4.07% and 3.55% respectively on average in 
1992 to 25.53% and 23.43% respectively in 2008. Foreign ownership of total market capital 
increases from 14.4% to 37.3% during the sample period. There was a corresponding decrease in 
excess vote of the largest domestic shareholder from 15.15% in 1992 to 7.40% in 2008; their 
ownership and voting declined from  35.05% and  50.21% respectively in 1992 to 21.32% and 
28.72% respectively in 2008. The same period saw a concurrent: (i) 53% decrease in the use of 
dual class shares from 86.63% in 1992 to 45.95% in 2008; (ii) 5% annual compounded growth 
rate in GDP from SEK 1,448 billion in 1992 to SEK 3,182 billon in 2008; (iii) 13% annual gain 
in market capitalization from SEK 552 billion in 1992 to SEK 3,691 billion in 2008; and (iv) 8% 
annual expansion in initial public offerings.  
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 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 
F–Capital  4.07 17.08 19.47 19.98 25.53 
F–Vote 3.55 14.11 18.03 18.52 23.43 
Foreign Ownership of Total Capital, % 14.40 32.10 39.20 33.30 37.30 
D1–Capital  35.05 26.79 23.05 22.73 21.32 
D1–Vote 50.21 39.41 32.92 30.79 28.72 
Excess Votet 15.15 12.62 9.87 8.06 7.40 
Firms with Dual Class Shares (%) 86.63 69.95 59.69 54.15 45.95 
GDP (SEK billions) 1,448 1,690 2,013 1,926 3,182 
Market Capitalization (SEK billions) 552 1,210 3,800 2,115 3,691 
Market Capitalization to GDP (%) 38.12 71.60 188.77 109.81 116.00 
New Issues (SEK billions) 1.79 2.74 2.73 4.10 6.50 
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Table 1.2:  Summary Statistics 
ROAt, ROEt, and EPSt, defined as Net Incomet divided by Average Total Assetst-1,t, Average 
Shareholders Equityt-1,t and Average Numbers of Shares Outstandingt-1,t, respectively, are used as 
proxies of firm profitability. ΔROAt,t+1, ΔROEt,t+1, and ΔEPSt,t+1 denote future (t,t+1) one-year 
changes in profitability. F-Directt, F-Portfoliot, and CSDt, denote changes in equity associated 
with foreign direct or foreign portfolio investors, and control-seeking domestic investors 
respectively. Number of employees (000s) is used as a surrogate for firm Sizet. Excess Votet is 
the difference between ownership and voting percentages of the largest domestic shareholder. F-
Direct Capitalt and F-Portfolio Capitalt are the ownership percentages of foreign direct and 
foreign portfolio investors. Capital Intensityt and Labor Productivityt are defined as Average 
Plant, Property, and Equipmentt-1,t divied by Average Number of Emplyeest-1,t. and Net Revenuet 
divided by Average Number of Emplyeest-1,t. ΔCapital Intensityt,t+1 and ΔLabor Productivityt,t+1 
denote future (t,t+1) one-year changes. 
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No. of 
Firm-Years 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
ROAt 1512 0.0112 0.1480 -0.7803 0.4936 
ROEt 1512 0.0299 0.3281 -2.0738 1.3924 
EPSt 1512 5.2189 10.3212 -42.7807 52.2858 
ΔROAt,t+1 1353 0.0013 0.1296 -0.7034 0.7364 
ΔROEt,t+1 1353 0.0046 0.3154 -2.9621 2.8013 
ΔEPSt,t+1 1353 0.3552 9.7142 -45.7407 51.0256 
F-Directt 1353 0.2341 0.4236 0 1 
F-Portfoliot 1353 0.3115 0.4633 0 1 
CSDt 1353 0.1581 0.3649 0 1 
Sizet 1512 9.3913 24.8464 0.0010 80.3690 
Excess Votet 1512 17.3236 12.6806 -20.2% 50.0% 
F-Direct Capitalt 1353 8.3158 12.2174 0% 78.9% 
F-Portfolio Capitalt 1353 5.3258 11.6084 0% 89.2% 
Capital Intensityt 1512 1.0335 2.1533 0.0054 34.1235 
Labor Productivityt 1509 2.0289 4.5026 0.0210 75.5864 
ΔCapital Intensityt,t+1 1353 0.0392 0.0429 -4.5703 5.7383 
ΔLabor Productivityt,t+1 1329 0.0992 0.0551 -5.4481 5.8997 
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Table 1.3:  Correlation Matrix 
ROAt, ROEt, and EPSt, defined as Net Incomet divided by Average Total Assetst-1,t, Average 
Shareholders Equityt-1,t and Average Numbers of Shares Outstandingt-1,t, respectively, are used as 
proxies of firm profitability. ΔROAt,t+1, ΔROEt,t+1, and ΔEPSt,t+1 denote future (t,t+1) one-year 
changes in profitability. F-Directt, F-Portfoliot, and CSDt, denote changes in equity associated 
with foreign direct or foreign portfolio investors, and control-seeking domestic investors 
respectively. Number of employees (000s) is used as a surrogate for firm Sizet. Excess Votet is 
the difference between ownership and voting percentages of the largest domestic shareholder. F-
Direct Capitalt and F-Portfolio Capitalt are the ownership percentages of foreign direct and 
foreign portfolio investors. Capital Intensityt and Labor Productivityt are defined as Average 
Plant, Property, and Equipmentt-1,t divided by Average Number of Emplyeest-1,t. and Net Revenuet 
divided by Average Number of Emplyeest-1,t. ΔCapital Intensityt,t+1 and ΔLabor Productivityt,t+1 
denote future (t,t+1) one-year changes. Panel A shows the correlations between the dependent 
variables (horizontal axis) and the independent variables (vertical axis). While Panel B reports 
the correlations between the independent variables. P-values are shown in parentheses. 
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 PANEL A ΔROAt,t+1 ΔROEt,t+1 ΔEPSt,t+1 
   ΔCapital 
 Intensityt,t+1 
  
     ΔLabor 
Productivityt,t+1 
 
F-Directt 
0.0732 0.0015 0.0735 0.0439 0.0385 
(0.01) (0.06) (0.01) (0.04) (0.07) 
F-Portfoliot 
-0.0405 -0.0048 -0.0532 -0.0160 0.0337 
(0.14) (0.86) (0.05) (0.46) (0.12) 
CSDt 
-0.0136 -0.0127 -0.0067 -0.0037 -0.0037 
(0.62) (0.64) (0.84) (0.87) (0.86) 
ROAt 
-0.4825 0.0652 -0.2158 0.0063 0.0063 
(0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.77) (0.77) 
ROEt 
0.1574 -0.7172 -0.1957 0.0008 0.0014 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.97) (0.95) 
EPSt 
-0.0629 -0.1200 -0.6654 -0.0064 -0.0007 
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.77) (0.97) 
Capital Intensityt 
-0.0007 -0.0071 0.0054 0.5189 0.0465 
(0.98) (0.94) (0.80) (0.00) (0.02) 
Labor Productivityt 
0.0110 0.0130 0.0269 0.0472 0.4187 
(0.61) (0.55) (0.21) (0.03) (0.00) 
Sizet 
-0.0054 -0.0011 -0.0004 -0.0161 -0.0046 
(0.84) (0.97) (0.99) (0.45) (0.83) 
Excess Votet 
-0.0215 -0.0144 -0.0304 0.0142 -0.0108 
(0.43) (0.60) (0.26) (0.51) (0.62) 
F-Direct Capitalt 
0.0207 0.0017 0.0223 -0.0031 -0.0221 
(0.45) (0.95) (0.41) (0.89) (0.39) 
F-Portfolio Capitalt 
-0.0890 -0.0382 -0.0096 0.0179 -0.0037 
(0.00) (0.16) (0.72) (0.40) (0.68) 
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Table 1.4:  Impact of Foreign Investors on Firm Performance 
Table reports two-way fixed effects regressions controlling for firm and year. ΔROAt,t+1, 
ΔROEt,t+1, and ΔEPSt,t+1 denote future (t,t+1) one-year changes in profitability. F-Directt, F-
Portfoliot, and CSDt, denote changes in equity associated with foreign direct or foreign portfolio 
investors, and control-seeking domestic investors respectively. Number of employees (000s) is 
used as a surrogate for firm Sizet. ROAt, ROEt, and EPSt, defined as Net Incomet divided by 
Average Total Assetst-1,t, Average Shareholders Equityt-1,t divided by Average Total Assetst-1,t, 
and Average Numbers of Shares Outstandingt-1,t, divided by Average Total Assetst-1,t  
respectively, are used as proxies of firm profitability. Excess Votet is the difference between 
ownership and voting percentages of the largest domestic shareholder. F-Direct Capitalt and F-
Portfolio Capitalt are the ownership percentages of foreign direct and foreign portfolio investors. 
P-values are shown in parentheses. ***Significant at the 0.01 level **Significant at the 0.05 
level *Significant at the 0.10 level.  
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 Dependent Variable 
          ΔROAt,t+1         ΔROEt,t+1         ΔEPSt,t+1 
F-Directt 
0.0809*** 0.0845*** 2.9995*** 
(0.001) (0.010) (0.003) 
F-Portfoliot 
-0.0149 0.0113 -1.9306** 
(0.496) (0.697) (0.030) 
CSDt 
0.0096 0.0185 -0.4044 
(0.540) (0.371) (0.524) 
Sizet 
-1.80E-05 -0.0002 -0.0183 
(0.973) (0.784) (0.407) 
Excess Votet 
-0.0003 -0.0007 0.0420 
(0.798) (0.611) (0.344) 
F-Direct Capitalt 
0.0015 0.0016 0.0512 
(0.105) (0.197) (0.164) 
F-Portfolio Capitalt 
-0.0019** -0.0016 -0.0122 
(0.029) (0.165) (0.730) 
ROAt 
-0.7191***   
(0.000)   
ROEt 
 -0.7403***  
 (0.000)  
EPSt 
  -0.6004*** 
  (0.000) 
Constant 
0.0131 0.0392  2.9215** 
(0.666) (0.328) (0.019) 
R
2 
0.3719 0.4549 0.3167 
Number of Firm-Years 1353 1353 1353 
Number of Firms 172 172 172 
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Table 1.5:  Intensity of Foreign Participation and Firm Performance 
Table reports two-way fixed effects regressions controlling for firm and year. ΔROAt,t+1, 
ΔROEt,t+1, and ΔEPSt,t+1 denote future (t,t+1) one-year changes in profitability. F-Directt X%, F-
Portfoliot X%, and CSDt X%, denote changes in equity associated with foreign direct or foreign 
portfolio investors, and control-seeking domestic investors respectively. Threshold percentages 
5%, 10%, and 20%, indicate the magnitudes of the change in voting rights associated with the 
level of involvement by foreign direct or portfolio investors and control-seeking domestic 
investors and are defined respectively as 5% ≤ X% < 10%, 10% ≤ X% < 20%, 20% ≤ X%. 
Number of employees (000s) is used as a surrogate for firm Sizet. ROAt, ROEt, and EPSt, defined 
as Net Incomet divided by Average Total Assetst-1,t, Average Shareholders Equityt-1,t divided by 
Average Total Assetst-1,t, and Average Numbers of Shares Outstandingt-1,t, divided by Average 
Total Assetst-1,t, respectively, are used as proxies of firm profitability. Excess Votet is the 
difference between ownership and voting percentages of the largest domestic shareholder. F-
Direct Capitalt and F-Portfolio Capitalt are the ownership percentages of foreign direct and 
foreign portfolio investors. P-values are shown in parentheses. ***Significant at the 0.01 level 
**Significant at the 0.05 level *Significant at the 0.10 level.  
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 Dependent Variable 
          ΔROAt,t+1         ΔROEt,t+1         ΔEPSt,t+1 
F-Directt 5% 
0.0335 0.0086 1.3992 
(0.266) (0.813) (0.209) 
F-Directt 10% 
0.0840* 0.1139** 3.8938** 
(0.059) (0.031) (0.023) 
F-Directt 20% 
0.1530** 0.2136*** 4.0896* 
(0.012) (0.006) (0.068) 
F-Portfoliot 5% 
0.0066 0.0112 -0.9690 
(0.797) (0.744) (0.349) 
F-Portfoliot 10% 
0.0132 0.0215 0.0294 
(0.695) (0.620) (0.983) 
F-Portfoliot 20% 
-0.0247 -0.0501 -0.7937 
(0.460) (0.247) (0.550) 
Sizet 
-0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0157 
(0.903) (0.806) (0.370) 
Excess Votet 
0.0002 0.0001 -0.0085 
(0.678) (0.917) (0.602) 
F-Direct Capitalt 
0.0009 0.0004 0.0181 
(0.278) (0.545) (0.365) 
F-Portfolio Capitalt 
0.0001 -0.0085 -0.2650 
(0.893) (0.614) (0.603) 
ROAt 
-0.2686***   
(0.000)   
ROEt 
 -0.3198***  
 (0.000)  
EPSt 
  -0.2591*** 
  (0.000) 
Constant 
-0.0086 -0.0203 1.6867*** 
(0.333) (0.299) (0.000) 
R
2 0.2275 0.2246 0.2241 
Number of Firm-Years 1353 1353 1353 
Number of Firms 172 172 172 
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Table 1.6:  Impact of Foreign Investors on Long-Term Firm Performance 
Table reports two-way fixed effects regressions controlling for firm and year. LTΔROAt,t+3, 
LTΔROEt,t+3, and LTΔEPSt,t+3 denote future (t,t+3) three-year average changes in profitability. F-
Directt, F-Portfoliot, and CSDt, denote changes in equity associated with foreign direct or 
portfolio investors, and control-seeking domestic investors respectively. Number of employees 
(000s) is used as a surrogate for firm Sizet. ROAt, ROEt, and EPSt, defined as Net Incomet divided 
by Average Total Assetst-1,t, Average Shareholders Equityt-1,t divided by Average Total Assetst-1,t, 
and Average Numbers of Shares Outstandingt-1,t, divided by Average Total Assetst-1,t, 
respectively, are used as proxies of firm profitability. Excess Votet is the difference between 
ownership and voting percentages of the largest domestic shareholder. F-Direct Capitalt and F-
Portfolio Capitalt are the ownership percentages of foreign direct and foreign portfolio investors. 
P-values are shown in parentheses. ***Significant at the 0.01 level **Significant at the 0.05 
level *Significant at the 0.10 level.  
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 Dependent Variable 
        LTΔROAt,t+3       LTΔROEt,t+3       LTΔEPSt,t+3 
F-Directt 
0.0385** 0.0403* 1.3520* 
(0.019) (0.075) (0.087) 
F-Portfoliot 
-0.0220 -0.0261 -0.5570 
(0.110) (0.168) (0.404) 
CSDt 
0.0135 -0.0028 -0.7192 
(0.172) (0.836) (0.217) 
Sizet 
-0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0239 
(0.840) (0.421) (0.155) 
Excess Votet 
-0.0003 -0.0013 -0.0116 
(0.722) (0.218) (0.589) 
F-Direct Capitalt 
0.0003 0.0004 0.0268 
(0.603) (0.664) (0.371) 
F-Portfolio Capitalt 
-0.0007 -0.0002 -0.0119 
(0.224) (0.803) (0.662) 
ROAt 
-0.8423***   
(0.000)   
ROEt 
 -0.8890***  
 (0.000)  
EPSt 
  -0.4985*** 
  (0.00) 
Constant 
0.0002 0.0572*** 2.8650*** 
(0.988) (0.007) (0.000) 
R
2 0.3933 0.3275 0.2234 
Number of Firm-Years 1039 1039 1039 
Number of Firms 161 161 161 
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Table 1.7:  Sources of Efficiency 
Table reports two-way fixed effects regressions controlling for firm and year. Average Plant, 
Property, and Equipmentt-1,t divided by Average Number of Emplyeest-1,t and Net Revenuet 
divided by Average Number of Emplyeest-1,t as proxies for Capital Intensityt and Labor 
Productivityt, respectively. ΔCapital Intensityt,t+1 and ΔLabor Productivityt,t+1, are future (t,t+1) 
changes in capital intensity and labor productivity, LTΔCapital Intensityt,t+3 and LTΔLabor 
Productivityt,t+3, are future three-year average changes in capital intensity and labor productivity. 
F-Directt, F-Portfoliot, and CSDt, denote changes in equity associated with foreign direct or 
foreign portfolio investors, and control-seeking domestic investors respectively. Number of 
employees (000s) is used as a surrogate for firm Sizet. ROAt, ROEt, and EPSt, defined as Net 
Incomet divided by Average Total Assetst-1,t, Average Shareholders Equityt-1,t divided by Average 
Total Assetst-1,t,  and Average Numbers of Shares Outstandingt-1,t, divided by Average Total 
Assetst-1,t,  respectively, are used as proxies of firm profitability. Excess Votet is the difference 
between ownership and voting percentages of the largest domestic shareholder. F-Direct Capitalt 
and F-Portfolio Capitalt are the ownership percentages of foreign direct and foreign portfolio 
investors. P-values are shown in parentheses. ***Significant at the 0.01 level **Significant at the 
0.05 level *Significant at the 0.10 level.  
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 Dependent Variable 
  
ΔLabor 
Productivityt,t
+1 
 
ΔCapital 
Intensityt,t+1 
 
LTΔLabor 
Productivity
t,t+3 
 
LTΔCapital 
Intensityt,t+3 
 
F-Directt 
279.2525** 194.9466*** 139.4983** 241.7478* 
(0.03) (0.00) (0.04) (0.10) 
F-Portfoliot 
74.4233 -33.1217* 46.5038 -26.4265 
(0.49) (0.10) (0.39) (0.28) 
CSDt 
59.4255 8.3270 21.1869 -1.3698 
(0.62) (0.76) (0.76) (0.41) 
Sizet 
0.2594 -0.1508 0.1399 0.3063 
(0.94) (0.84) (0.94) (0.96) 
Excess Votet 
-2.2377* -0.3176 -2.9872** 0.2780 
(0.07) (0.84) (0.04) (0.81) 
F-Direct Capitalt 
7.8998 0.3985 -0.3920 2.0710 
(0.12) (0.64) (0.90) (0.83) 
F-Portfolio Capitalt 
-6.7296 -5.8350*** -3.1831 -1.8168 
(0.11) (0.00) (0.16) (0.83) 
Capital Intensityt 
0.3617***  0.1892***  
(0.00)  (0.00)  
Labor Productivityt 
 0.2376***  0.4173*** 
 (0.00)  (0.00) 
Constant 
-64.9169 -174.8600*** -201.5610* -277.7420 
(0.14) (0.00) (0.07) (0.25) 
R
2 0.2833 0.3118 0.2479 0.2888 
Number of Firm-Years 1329 1353 1035 1046 
Number of Firms 170 172 159 160 
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Table 1.8:  Robustness Test 
Table reports two-way fixed effects regressions controlling for firm and year focused around 
firm-years where the excess vote percentage of the largest domestic shareholder declined. In 
Panel A, declines in excess votes are associated with increases in the voting percentages of 
foreign direct and control-seeking domestic investors. In Panel B, declines in excess votes are 
associated with increases in the voting percentage of control-seeking domestic shareholders that 
more than offset decreases in the voting percentage of foreign direct investors. These voting 
percentage changes are denoted by              
 ,         
 ,         
 , and    
     
 , respectively. ΔROAt,t+1, ΔROEt,t+1, and ΔEPSt,t+1 denote future (t,t+1) one-year changes 
in profitability; and LTΔROAt,t+3, LTΔROEt,t+3, and LTΔEPSt,t+3 denote future (t,t+3) three-year 
average changes in profitability. Number of employees (000s) is used as a surrogate for firm 
Sizet. ROAt, ROEt, and EPSt, defined as Net Incomet divided by Average Total Assetst-1,t, Average 
Shareholders Equityt-1,t divided by Average Total Assetst-1,t, and Average Numbers of Shares 
Outstandingt-1,t, divided by Average Total Assetst-1,t,  respectively, are used as proxies of firm 
profitability. Excess Votet is the difference between ownership and voting percentages of the 
largest domestic shareholder. F-Direct Capitalt and F-Portfolio Capitalt are the ownership 
percentages of foreign direct and foreign portfolio investors. P-values are shown in parentheses. 
***Significant at the 0.01 level **Significant at the 0.05 level *Significant at the 0.10 level. 
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PANEL A 
  
Dependent Variable 
ΔROAt,t+1 ΔROEt,t+1 ΔEPSt,t+1 LTΔROAt,t+3 
LTΔROEt,t+3 
LTΔEPSt,t+3 
        
  
0.0008 0.0003 0.0624 0.0011 0.0006 0.1241 
(0.645) (0.953) (0.566) (0.288) (0.399) (0.185) 
        
 
 
0.0007  -0.0023 0.0306  -0.0007 -0.0033 -0.0051 
(0.634) (0.474) (0.713) (0.427) (0.143) (0.951) 
             
  
0.0034 0.0035 0.0862 0.0014 0.0027 0.0372 
(0.220) (0.572) (0.588) (0.431) (0.603) (0.844) 
             
  (X) 
        
  
0.0013** 0.0036* 0.0368* 0.0011*** 0.0044* 0.0359** 
(0.037) (0.069) (0.058) (0.004) (0.087) (0.016) 
             
  (X) 
        
  
0.0001 -0.0019 -0.0098 -5.28E-06 -8.7E-05 0.0102 
(0.840) (0.611) (0.300) (0.974) (0.848) (0.537) 
Sizet 
0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0168 -3.14E-07 -0.0005 -0.0326 
(0.825) (0.940) (0.639) (0.999) (0.533) (0.239) 
Excess Votet 
0.0006 -0.0008 0.1662 -0.0019 -0.0048 -0.0897 
(0.652) (0.812) (0.530) (0.156) (0.141) (0.302) 
F-Direct Capitalt 
0.0004 -0.0010 0.0176 0.0005 -0.0003 0.0225 
(0.569) (0.628) (0.737) (0.272) (0.804) (0.587) 
F-Portfolio Capitalt 
-0.0017 0.0003 -0.0817 9.94E-05 2.29E-06 -0.0413 
(0.780) (0.842) (0.420) (0.794) (0.998) (0.240) 
ROAt 
-0.5908***   -0.7903***   
(0.000)   (0.000)   
ROEt 
 -1.0178***   -1.0149***  
 (0.000)   (0.000)  
EPSt 
  -0.9763***   -1.0832*** 
  (0.000)   (0.000) 
Constant 
-0.0715 0.0604  2.6662  0.0310 0.0156 *** 1.0767 *** 
(0.126) (0.538) (0.294) (0.810) (0.010) (0.007) 
R
2 712 712 712 523 523 523 
Number of Firm-Years 0.3601 0.4604 0.5047 0.4008 0.4309 0.5147 
Number of Firms 161 161 161 147 147 147 
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PANEL B 
  
Dependent Variable 
ΔROAt,t+1 ΔROEt,t+1 ΔEPSt,t+1 LTΔROAt,t+3 
LTΔROEt,t+3 
LTΔEPSt,t+3 
        
  
0.0016 0.0015 -0.0227 0.0003 0.0010 -0.0193 
(0.433) (0.760) (0.857) (0.739) (0.839) (0.946) 
        
 
 
-0.0024 -0.0034 -0.1505 -0.0013 -0.0068 -0.2550 
(0.126) (0.367) (0.115) (0.383) (0.280) (0.111) 
             
  
-0.0029 -0.0022 0.2001 0.0001 0.0027 0.2685 
(0.386) (0.780) (0.330) (0.937) (0.638) (0.229) 
             
  (X) 
        
  
-0.0004 -0.0009 -0.0147 -0.0005 0.0047 -0.1071 
(0.507) (0.555) (0.700) (0.148) (0.174) (0.584) 
             
  (X) 
        
  
5.28E-05 0.0003 -0.0088 -0.0001 -0.0008 -0.0587 
(0.801) (0.586) (0.486) (0.394) (0.550) (0.169) 
Sizet 
1.07E-04 1.00E-04 0.0020 -2.45E-05 6.82E-05 -0.1330 
(0.903) (0.998) (0.970) (0.943) (0.980) (0.217) 
Excess Votet 
-0.0018 -0.0015 0.0489 -0.0023 -0.0028 -0.2403 
(0.364) (0.762) (0.692) (0.270) (0.395) (0.153) 
F-Direct Capitalt 
0.0061 0.0033 -0.0321 0.0002 0.0184 -0.0868 
(0.579) (0.900) (0.962) (0.643) (0.170) (0.830) 
F-Portfolio Capitalt 
-0.0013 2.86E-05 -0.0032 0.0003 0.0007 -0.0048 
(0.562) (0.996) (0.998) (0.397) (0.401) (0.984) 
ROAt 
-0.9416***   -1.0238***   
(0.000)   (0.000)   
ROEt 
 -0.6492***   -0.9190***  
 (0.000)   (0.000)  
EPSt 
  -1.0294***   -1.1388*** 
  (0.000)   (0.000) 
Constant 
0.0297 0.1249 0.0528  0.0325 0.0693 1.0278  
(0.377) (0.118) (0.510) (0.034) (0.240) (0.010) 
R
2 632 632 632 296 296 296 
Number of Firm-Years 0.3566 0.3314 0.3010 0.2966 0.2846 0.2506 
Number of Firms 141 141 141 102 102 102 
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2.   Institutional Impact on the Outreach and Profitability of Microfinance Organizations 
 
Abstract 
In 2006, Dr. Muhammad Yunus shared the Nobel Peace Prize with the institution he founded, 
Grameen Bank, a microfinance organization and community development bank in Bangladesh. 
More than three decades after its founding, formalized microfinance has expanded to hundreds of 
countries by way of thousands of institutions, all extending financial services to the traditionally 
underserved, whom we call the “non-banked”, especially the rural poor and micro-entrepreneurs. 
In this study, we investigate the impact of formal and informal institutions on the outreach and 
profitability of microfinance organizations. We find that strong formal institutions foster better 
efficiency and outreach while strong informal institutions’ impact is limited to better outreach. 
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2.1   INTRODUCTION 
In 2006, Dr. Muhammad Yunus shared the Nobel Peace Prize with the institution he 
founded, Grameen Bank, a microfinance organization and community development bank in 
Bangladesh. More than three decades after its founding, formalized microfinance (as opposed to 
traditional, often predatory, money-lending) has expanded to hundreds of countries by way of 
thousands of institutions, all extending financial services to the traditionally underserved, whom 
we call the “non-banked”, especially the rural poor and micro-entrepreneurs.  
As microfinance organizations continue to grow and expand their services, various forms 
of organizational structure emerge.  Some remain purely philanthropic, relying on governments 
and NGOs for funds. These organizations focus on reaching the poor; loan performance is a 
lesser concern.   Others introduce funds from the private sector and gradually move away from 
the micro-loan models and shift resources toward larger loans.  Yet many others aspire to strike a 
subtle balance between profitability and outreach, aiming at financial self-sustainability while 
providing needed social services to the poor.  The organizational structure chosen by a 
microfinance institution largely depends on the community they serve, which has its unique 
social characteristics, including cultural heritage and popular values, commonly referred to as 
“informal institutions”, and legal rules, government effectiveness, and regulatory environment, 
known as “formal institutions”.    
This paper attempts a first pass analysis to understand the impact of formal and informal 
institutions on the success of microfinance institutions. We are interested to see how a 
microfinance organization’s external environment affects its profitability and outreach goals.  
This study will provide policy makers and investors some guidance as to what changes are 
necessary to accompany the improved access to capital in an effort to reduce and ultimately 
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eradicate poverty.   
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 2.2 introduces microfinance 
business models around the world.  Section 2.3 explores the definitions of formal and informal 
institutions and explains why they matter in the context of microfinance.  Section 2.4 introduces 
the data used in this paper.  Sections 2.5 and 2.6 discuss what constitutes success by exploring 
profitability and outreach metrics and their relation to the external institutions of a society. 
Section 2.7 concludes.  
2.2   MICROFINANCE AND MICROFINANCE INSTITUTIONS (MFIs) 
 While microfinance service has expanded in some areas to include savings accounts, 
deposit taking, and insurance services, most microfinance service is microcredit, that of granting 
small (or ‘micro’) loans to the poor, usually without pledges of traditional collateral. There are a 
number of reasons why traditional banks cannot or choose not to provide services to the poor. 
The poor often have little or no net worth and therefore cannot pledge collateral as a personal 
guarantee of loan repayment. They often need very small loans but the costs to service loans do 
not depend upon loan size; that is, the costs incurred by the bank in servicing a small loan are 
comparable to that of servicing a large loan. It is therefore much more cost efficient for a bank to 
lend larger amounts and have minimum loan amounts that exclude small borrowers. And in the 
absence of collateral, financial statements, and credit histories, the risk that micro borrowers may 
default is difficult for traditional banks to gauge accurately. Physical distance may also be an 
issue for both the borrower and the traditional bank as it is difficult for borrowers to travel any 
distance to repay their loans and costly for bank representatives to visit rural borrowers and 
monitor loans.  
 Microfinance institutions (MFIs) charge higher interest rates to their borrowers to cover 
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the higher costs of servicing microloans. Reported interest rates vary considerably, and are 
reported as high as 20% per day, or 18%-200% annually on declining loan balance.
1
 How, one may ask, would 20% per day be satisfactory to the borrower? One must take into 
consideration the explosive gains in efficiency that credit affords the rural, poor, entrepreneur. 
For example, consider a small grocer in a rural village in a developing country. With relatively 
poor infrastructure, transportation, and limited financial resources, the grocer must close her 
shop every other day as she travels a far distance to buy inventory for her shelves, which she 
pays for with the profits from the previous day’s sales. If, however, she has a small loan for a 
week she is able to buy a week’s worth of inventory and close the shop only on the one day 
needed to travel for supplies. Her store is better stocked with a larger and broader inventory, is 
open for business more frequently, and the efficiencies gained mean more opening hours, more 
product sold, and more attention paid to other business needs (other than inventory 
procurement). More efficiency ultimately means more revenues at lower cost and part of these 
‘efficiency improvement profits’ are used to repay the loan and interest. And much like business 
in the developed world that relies upon short term credit and liquidity, the grocer then gets 
another week-long loan for another week of inventory.  
 If MFIs can charge higher fees to cover their higher administrative costs, one large 
impediment to providing financial services to the underserved is overcome. As important, 
however, are the combined effects of several innovations in microfinance that allow MFIs to be 
successful where traditional banks are not.  
 A profound innovation in microfinance is the practice of joint liability through group 
lending. The MFI harnesses the power of group dynamics, the intimate communal knowledge 
                                                          
1
 Robinson, Marguerite S. 2001. The Microfinance Revolution: Sustainable Finance for the 
Poor. 
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shared by locals, and collective advancement or consequences to outsource a significant portion 
of information gathering and loan monitoring. Groups, as opposed to individuals, apply for a 
loan. Members of the group are then jointly responsible for loan repayment. If the loan is repaid 
the group is in good standing to receive another loan. If one member defaults the entire group is 
responsible and is less likely to get a loan in the future (Khandker, 1998). Progressive lending 
practices allow for future loans to be larger than the initial loans, adding incentive for groups to 
repay their loans. Importantly, where traditional banks would increase interest rates to offset 
increased repayment risk, MFIs use group monitoring – as members monitor each other and have 
to rescue defaulting members on their own – to decrease repayment risk and/or offset default 
costs.
2
 Furthermore, there is a smaller probability of strategic default
3
 since members jointly 
suffer even if only one member defaults.  
 Frequent and public loan payments also serve to increase the likelihood of repayment. 
Frequent repayments decrease the likelihood that excess funds – from a profitable business, for 
example – are used by extended family members in need, a common practice in rural and 
developing communities, instead of meeting loan obligations. Of course, most of us share the 
common temptation to spend more as funds increase and are otherwise idle. The rural poor are 
no different. Public repayment increases the social stigma of non-repayment and potentially 
increases the village or group’s trust in those who make payments. Frequent and public 
repayment also decreases the possibility that MFI officials or loan representatives are corrupted 
as the public knows who paid, how much, and how often. It also keeps MFI administrative costs 
                                                          
2
 Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch, The Economics of Microfinance, 2005. 
3
 Strategic default refers to the decision of a borrower to default because the perceived cost of 
default to the borrower is less than the cost of keeping the loan current. For example, a 
homeowner may choose to strategically default on her mortgage (walk away from her home and 
let the property fall into foreclosure) if home prices have plummeted, making her loan balance 
much greater than the market value of the home. 
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in check if representatives are able to meet with many clients locally at one time.  
MFIs may also accept pledges of non-traditional collateral as a guarantee of repayment. 
Non-traditional collateral may be anything that the owner values, regardless of how the market 
would price the collateral. Often items with family history or sentimental value attached are 
‘worth’ more to their owners than the market.  As a condition to receiving loans, MFIs may have 
savings requirements. Savings serve as collateral, as a means of providing other loans as savings 
are mobilized among the community, and/or simply serve as an additional applicant screening 
mechanism.   
 Many MFIs work disproportionally with women clients as, regardless of local or regional 
gender equity norms, women have higher repayment rates than men. Women often have less 
access to traditional banking services than men. Women may also be more attuned to group 
dynamics, social advancement, and repercussions, making them less risky in group lending 
environments. 
[Insert Table 2.1 about here.] 
 MFIs started simply by offering small loans to rural poor entrepreneurs; in the ensuing 
decades microfinance became a dynamic subset of global finance offering diverse financial 
services to the traditionally underserved. MFIs differ in size, scope, services offered, 
organizational structure, regulatory environment, profitability, dependence upon government or 
nongovernmental subsidies and grants, outreach, as well as client mix, among other measures.  
 Many MFIs, particularly those financed by non-philanthropic funds, find themselves 
serving two – although not necessarily mutually exclusive – masters: social outreach and 
profitability. MFIs strive to be an agent of development in the greater community as well as self-
sustaining – not relying upon the vagaries of external grants and donations. However outreach 
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and profitability are often at odds and MFIs face tradeoffs between social outreach metrics, 
which are more difficult to quantify and traditional profitability measures.  
The business model and organizational structure chosen by an MFI depends to a large 
degree upon the community it serves, taking into account such things as cultural norms, values, 
infrastructure, the regulatory environment, size of the community, existence of competition, and 
many other factors. Flexibility, the ability of an MFI to adapt to changing circumstances, is 
important for survival. Some of the more common permutations of the MFI model are presented 
in Table 2.2.  
[Insert Table 2.2 about here.] 
An MFI is born of both social needs and entrepreneurial activity. The practices and 
organizational structure of each institution evolve over time within the structure and norms of 
local formal and informal institutions. The rest of this study explores the definitions of formal 
and informal institutions and explains why they matter in the context of microfinance.  We then 
examine what constitutes success by exploring profitability measures and outreach metrics. We 
provide a snapshot of microfinance around the world, and conclude with closing comments and 
suggest areas requiring future research and development.  
2.3   INSTITUIONAL ATTRIBUTES AND MFI SUCCESS 
The financial success and self-sustainability of microfinance institutions depend upon the 
social, political, economic, and cultural environments of the host country, aggregated as the 
institutional attributes of a society.  As all other players in society, MFIs are subject to the 
constraints required by the formal “rules of the game”, including the nature of its host country’s 
legal system, the strength of property right protection, the regulatory stance and efficiency of its 
government, as well as the breadth and strength of industry-specific regulations.  The success of 
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MFIs also hinge on the set of societal factors that affect the behavioral norms of citizens, 
commonly termed informal institutions, which include culture, religious beliefs, social hierarchy, 
and trust among strangers. The following section describes how each institutional feature affects 
the financial and social performance of microfinance institutions in different countries.  
2.3.1   Formal Institutions 
Formal institutions include governance, regulation, legal origin and the rule of law, 
property rights, as well as the level of bureaucratic corruption. Governmental structure and the 
degree to which the citizenry can lend their voice to governmental action are important. The 
relative freedom of individuals to change their status and move freely within the system 
encourages or discourages entrepreneurial activity, and thus microfinance lending. In contrast to 
London and Hart (2004), we find that formal institutions, such as property rights protection and 
formal contract enforcement are still relevant in determining MFI success.  
 As the legal system of many countries is in large part a function of prior colonial rule, 
legal origin lends itself to governance, legal and regulatory norms. Civil law holds legislation as 
the primary source of law and precedent is not binding for courts. An example of a civil law 
system is the Napoleonic Code. Common law, on the other hand, is the compilation of court 
rulings that forms legal precedent. New issues and cases are decided keeping in mind how 
similar preceding cases were decided. The British and United States have common law systems. 
The common – but contested – wisdom in academic literature is that common law systems tend 
to foster more developed financial markets, wherein market mechanisms steer the rise and fall of 
business developments. Economic resources are more likely to be prioritized and/or directed by 
the state in civil law countries.  
 Regulatory environment, especially with regard to the financial system, is an important 
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issue for microfinance. Regulation of financial institutions adds a layer of bureaucratic 
requirements, filings, and oversight that increases institutional costs. However regulation should 
come with benefits as regulated firms also have access to lines of credit or insured deposits that 
they would not enjoy without regulation. Many MFIs have the ability to choose, at least in the 
beginning, whether or not to be regulated, with all of the opportunities and costs associated with 
such status. Once an MFI grows to a certain size it may be required by the state to be regulated. 
Efficient regulation can help an MFI grow; burdensome regulation with high compliance costs 
could drive smaller, weaker MFIs to fail. One would expect regulated MFIs, with their higher 
costs, to have stronger profitability metrics and weaker outreach metrics while unregulated 
organizations would be freer to pursue social outreach but at the expense of profitability.  
 Corruption, as related to government, bureaucracy, and regulation, is an added cost to 
MFIs, both in terms of social cost and actual cost. Significant corruption increases the cost of 
doing business and erodes the level of trust between bureaucrats and MFIs as well as between 
MFIs and their clients to the extent that the clientele view the MFI as part of the establishment.  
2.3.2   Informal Institutions  
The financial sustainability of microfinance institutions also depends upon the implicit 
rules of the game, or informal institutions.  Dimensions of informal institutions include culture, 
religion, hierarchical structure, and the perception of trustworthiness among strangers.  The 
lending and borrowing relationships between a microfinance institution and its borrowers reflect 
not only a formal contract that specifies the terms of the loans and repayments, but also an 
implicit agreement involving trust and a mutual understanding of the consequences of a 
particular outcome. These consequences may include culturally embedded rewards and 
punishments like increases in status or loss of reputation. The strength of informal institutions 
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will have a direct impact on the severity of punishment, such as social stigma, when an 
agreement is violated.  
 Cultural differences also manifest in a society’s ability to create new enterprises. 
Research shows that some cultures value entrepreneurial spirit more than others (see, for 
example, Casson, 1993).  A culture valuing strict hierarchy in organizations and demands docile 
respect from subordinates tends to discourage entrepreneurial activity, as it is unlikely the 
entrepreneur would be ‘allowed’ an increase in status. This reduces the demand for microloans, 
thus adversely affecting the outreach and financial performance of microfinance institutions in 
these circumstances.      
 In order to make meaningful comparisons we employ Geert Hofstede’s four cultural 
dimensions: power distance, individualism, masculinity, and uncertainty avoidance.  Each 
dimension is presented as an index. A higher value on the power distance index (PDI) indicates 
that members of the lower strata of society more willingly accept hierarchical structure and the 
unequal distribution of wealth and power.  For example, the PDI values for the United Kingdom 
and the United States are 35 and 40, respectively, as citizens in these countries value their ability 
to question authority and pursue their dreams.  In contrast, the PDI index for both China and the 
Arab countries is 80. In these societies, people have significantly less upward mobility, obey 
authority, and tolerate both unequal power and wealth distributions.     
 A higher value on the individualism index indicates a societal preference for maximizing 
personal as opposed to collective well-being. The U.S., U.K., and Australia have the greatest 
individualism. China, Guatemala, and Columbia are at the other end of the scale.  An 
individualist culture may encourage independent thinking; stimulate entrepreneurial ventures; 
thus increasing the demand for microloans and the success of microfinance institutions. 
 60 
 
 Hofstede’s third cultural dimension, masculinity, reflects the distribution of gender roles.  
A higher index value implies that the culture’s men are more aggressive, assertive, competitive, 
and that their societal role is distinctly separate from that of women than in societies with lower 
values. Although these ‘masculine’ tendencies – assertiveness, competitiveness – are also more 
prevalent in women in cultures with high masculinity values, the gap between male and female 
behavior is still wider in these countries than in ones with lower values.  
 The last dimension, uncertainty avoidance, measures societal tolerance for uncertainty 
and risk. Higher levels of uncertainty avoidance – preference for certainty – indicate a lower 
societal preference for ‘taking a chance’. Entrepreneurs, by definition, take greater risk and 
explore new ideas. Countries that value certainty over risk taking are therefore expected to have 
less entrepreneurial activity and, therefore, less demand for microcredit.  
2.4   DATA 
The Microfinance Information Exchange (or MIX Market) provides detailed data on the 
financial and social performance of microfinance institutions in our study.  The data include 
observations from 1997 to 2008, approximately 6,000 firm-year observations.  Table 2.3 
provides a yearly summary of different types of MFIs in our sample.   
[Insert Table 2.3 about here.] 
An international comparison of microfinance lenders must take into account the level of 
regulation to which each entity is subject.  We hand collect this information on each entity in 
MIX Market, creating a binary variable equal to one if the entity is regulated, zero if not.  
Banking literature (Flannery et al., 2004 and Stiroh and Rumble, 2006) generally suggests that 
regulation increases the cost of doing business, thus reducing financial performance. This cost is 
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often called regulatory burden.  A simple t-test
4
 comparing regulated and unregulated MFIs 
shows that regulated MFIs tend to be older, have greater assets, and are more likely to be for 
profit rather than non-profit entities. Regulated MFIs issue larger, traditionally safer loans. 
Regulated MFIs tend to show higher performance but lower outreach measures and the clientele 
of regulated MFIs tend to be wealthier. 
Our MFI financial and social performance indicators build upon United Nations Capital 
Development Fund (UNCDF) publications.  Financial performance indicators include 
profitability, as measured by return on assets (ROA), efficiency, as measured by operating 
expense as a percentage of total outstanding loans and cost per client, and loan performance, 
measured by the ratio of loan write-offs to outstanding loans. Social performance, or outreach, 
measures include the number of accounts, the percentage of women borrowers to total active 
borrowers, and client poverty level, measured by the average outstanding loan size as a 
percentage of per capita gross national income. 
[Insert Table 2.4 about here.] 
2.5   PROFITABILITY 
Our primary interest is a cross country comparison of the effect of national characteristics 
on MFI profitability and outreach. We adopt a random effect panel approach to model the 
institutional differences among countries.  Because our sample includes multiple microfinance 
organizations coupled with country-level institutions, we cannot treat each organization as 
separate independently identically distributed observations.  Statistically, those locally correlated 
factors produce biased estimates of standard errors. We therefore use random effects panel 
regressions with the Moulton correction (Moulton, 1986) to cluster the standard errors at country 
                                                          
4
 Results are not reported but are available from authors.  
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level to account for unobserved, locally correlated factors
5
.  
In this section we investigate the effects of selected formal and informal institution 
measures on profitability (ROA), collection performance (impaired loans to assets) and efficient 
cost control (operating expense to assets).  Table 2.5 shows the results from random effects panel 
regressions using robust clustered standard errors at the country level. Columns 1, 2, and 3 
investigate select formal institution measures on profitability, collection performance, and cost 
control, respectively. We control for year and country to take into account economic 
development measures and firm-specific measures. We use eleven economic development 
variables divided into two distinct types: infrastructure and economic development. 
Infrastructure variables include, for example, the number of miles of roads, road density, and 
whether or not the roads are paved. Economic variables include gross domestic product the 
percentage of agriculture to total economic activity. As representatives of these two types, we 
chose roads and gross domestic product at purchasing power parity per capita (GDPpercapita-
PPP in thousands) for our regressions. Our results are robust using alternative measures. For 
firm-specific controls, we control for the age, size, capital structure, and non-profit status. Age 
and size must be controlled because MFIs can suffer “mission drift” as they grow in size, scope, 
or age. Also a MFIs capital structure may affect the extent to which they may lend and under 
what conditions. For profit and non-profit MFI will also differ in business modeling. 
For formal institution measures we use the control of corruption index (Kaufmann et al., 
2003) and a dummy variable for common law legal origin. Though other measures can be 
substituted, such as the regulation, rule, and voice indices, they are highly correlated. In one way 
or another each variable measures the quality of government and the power of the citizenry. 
                                                          
5
 We thank Oliver Falck for pointing out the appropriateness of using this methodology. 
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Legal origin, however, is specifically correlated with the quality of laws. Variables such as 
investment protection, director liability, and disclosure indices specifically address commercial 
law. All are found to be highly related to legal origin and greater in common law countries than 
civil law countries. Legal origin is therefore our independent variable. Column 1 shows a 
negative relationship between performance (ROA) and the strength of formal institutions. The 
coefficient for control of corruption is -0.0164 but statistically insignificant while the coefficient 
for common law origin is -.1006 and statistically significant at the 1% level. This indicates that 
MFIs operating in a less corrupt environment have lower performance. This may seem puzzling, 
but our results indicate that these same firms tend to offer smaller loans at lower interest rates 
than MFIs in civil law countries, and therefore receive lower returns (See Table 2.6). Columns 2 
and 3 show mixed results for impaired loans and operating expenses. Overall, better corruption 
control is associated with lower levels of loan impairment and a lower operating expense to asset 
ratio. On the other hand, common law legal origin is positively associated with levels of 
impairment and operating expense.  
 The control variables for economic development are all significant in the first three 
columns. The road variable coefficient is 0.1002, -0.0237, and -0.3037 for ROA, impairment and 
operating expense respectively. The better the infrastructure the more efficient and profitable the 
MFIs. This is probably due to the fact that it is easier for MFIs to monitor their loans and meet 
with their clientele in sparsely populated rural areas with better roads. GDP per capita shows the 
opposite signs of infrastructure development. MFIs tend to perform more poorly in richer 
nations. For example, attempts to provide microcredit to the rural poor in the U.S. have proved 
unsuccessful. For firm-specific control variables, age and for-profit measures are the significant 
and show similar relationships with performance and efficiency. As expected, older MFIs tend to 
 64 
 
be more profitable. This may be due in part to “mission drift” as these institutions move to serve 
wealthier clients. Debt to equity does not seem to affect profitability of the MFIs measured by 
ROA, but shows significantly negative coefficients for efficiency.  
 Columns 4 through 6 reexamine performance and efficiency using informal institution 
measures. The economic development and firm-specific control variables are largely consistent 
with the first three models.  Using Hofstede’s cultural dimensions as defined above we find that 
individualism leads to lower profits, higher loan impairment, and higher expenses. The latter are 
both significant at the 1% level. Individualism appears to be the most important determinant in 
performance and efficiency among all cultural measures. Although group lending reduces 
monitoring costs, MFIs in high individualism areas may not benefit if less importance is placed 
upon group dynamics and collective well-being.  Power distance and uncertainty avoidance seem 
to have little explanatory power in MFI performance or efficiency. Masculinity is also 
insignificant in models 4 and 6. However, it is positively and significantly related to impairment 
of loans, indicating poorer loan performance in male dominated societies and societies intolerant 
of new ideas. 
[Insert Table 2.5 about here.] 
2.6   OUTREACH 
In this section we investigate the effects of select formal and informal institution 
measures on outreach (number of active borrowers) and target clientele (percentage of women 
borrowers and average loan size). Table 2.6 shows the results from random effects panel 
regressions using robust clustered standard errors at the country level. Columns 1, 2, and 3 
investigate select formal institution measures on outreach and target clientele. Columns 4 
through 6 reexamine these models using informal institution measures. With controls for year 
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and country we take into account economic development measures and firm-specific measures as 
in prior regressions.  
Starting with the economic development variables, we see roads contributing to better 
outreach overall although the coefficient in the first model is insignificant.  Increasing roads also 
show a negative impact on the proportion of female borrowers as well as an increase in loan size. 
This is similar to what we would expect for larger, older MFIs. The roads variable is an 
infrastructure development variable. It is conceivable that there is a correlation between 
infrastructure development and micro financing development. If this is the case, then we expect 
MFIs to have grown in these countries and have more clientele. At the same time we expect them 
to shift away from the poor and toward profit generating lines of business by issuing larger, more 
secure loans. GDP per capita is associated with fewer borrowers and larger loan sizes. As the 
citizenry is better off, they may take their businesses to more traditional banks rather than MFIs 
since the citizens are in a better position to provide credit histories, financial statements, 
traditional collateral, and thereby pay lower interest rates on their loans. Therefore there is 
probably more competition between MFIs and traditional banks in richer countries. Loan size 
should also be expected to be larger with greater client wealth. 
 Firm-specific control variables indicate the importance of age, size, capital structure, and 
non-profit status to outreach and target clientele. As MFIs get older and or larger, they tend to 
increase the number of borrowers but issue larger loans to relatively fewer women. The 
coefficients for size are all significant for the first three models while those for age are 
significant in two of the first three models. For profit MFIs shift away from female borrowers 
and the poor and toward a more traditional clientele. However, location will affect the number of 
clients that profit institutions have. MFIs with high debt ratios reach fewer total borrowers, shift 
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away from female borrowers and offer larger loans. High debt ratios may hamper MFIs from 
being able to offer riskier loans to women and the poor. The results for debt to equity ratio are 
consistent and highly significant across all 6 models. 
The corruption variable in Columns 1 through 3 is not significant in any of the models 
but the signs of the coefficients are consistent with expectations. Better protection against 
corruption increases participation in MFIs and allows smaller average loan size. The common 
law legal origin variable shows signs consistent with those of the corruption protection variable. 
In this case, however, all coefficients are significant at the 10% level or better. MFIs in countries 
with common law have significantly more borrowers, a higher percentage of female borrowers, 
and offer smaller loans on average. This means these MFIs have greater market penetration and 
reach a greater percentage of the traditionally underserved, namely women and the rural poor.  
In columns 4 through 6 we reexamine the relationships between outreach and target 
clientele measures with informal institution measures. The economic development and firm 
specific control variables are consistent with the first three models with the notable exception of 
for profit in models 1 and 4.  Using Hofstede’s cultural dimensions we find that individualism 
shows a positive and significant impact on number of borrowers.  Individualism likely increases 
the number of borrowers as individuals as opposed to groups or villages apply for loans. This is 
consistent with the result that individualism is negatively associated with the size of the loan (see 
column 6) as individual loans are usually smaller than village or group loans. Masculinity shows 
a similar pattern (although statistically insignificant), as individuals may be more assertive and 
aggressive in pursuing goals by acquiring loans.  Power distance has an insignificantly negative 
impact on the number of borrowers but a negative significant impact on the size of the loan. It 
may be that the poor in high power distance countries have realistic expectations as to social 
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mobility, or lack thereof, and do not bother seeking credit. Those who do may require smaller 
loans. High power distance may suffocate entrepreneurial spirit in the lower income populace.  
We also see that individualism and power distance have a positive statistical impact on the 
proportion of female borrowers. The only unexpected result again involves uncertainty 
avoidance. Contrary to expectations, it appears that societies with a greater preference for 
certainty also have more borrowers. The findings are significant at the 10% level.  It is also 
robust to a different specification that controls for the size of total population in the country. 
[Insert Table 2.6 about here.] 
2.7   SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
As commercial, governmental, and philanthropic organizations continue to channel 
resources to providing microfinance services to the poor, it is essential to understand what makes 
such efforts successful.  In this paper, we conduct a first pass analysis attempting to understand 
the impact of formal and informal institutions, the legal, political, economic, and cultural aspects 
of society, on the financial performance and outreach of microfinance services.   
We show that societies with strong formal institutions, as represented by common law 
legal origin, foster more efficient MFIs in terms of social outreach. These MFIs often must 
endure lower profitability, relatively, to provide greater outreach and communal economic 
development. Lower corruption assists by lowering loan impairment, which in turn should lower 
overall costs to MFIs.  
The effects of cultural dimensions on MFI performance are more complex, as one might 
expect. Individualism increases the number of borrowers and decreases the size of the loans but 
at the expense of increasing the cost and risk of lending.  In addition, a society more comfortable 
with certainty, rather than entrepreneurial spirit, has better outreach performance as measured by 
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number of borrowers but seems to shift away from female and poor borrowers.  
Microfinance is in many ways still in its infancy as a subset of global finance. More work 
needs to be done to help tailor the availability of microcredit and other financial services to those 
unable to access the traditional banking system. Just like the clients they serve, MFIs can benefit 
greatly if they have access to better tools, which in turn aids the continued development and well 
being of the groups, villages, women, and entrepreneurs served by microfinance institutions. 
MFIs, on the other hand, must also be profitable and sustainable in order to continue to serve the 
rural poor and break the cycle of poverty. 
  
 69 
 
REFERENCES 
Abbink, K. 2006. Group size and social ties in microfinance institutions. Economic Inquiry 44 
(4): 614-628. 
Armendariz De Aghion, Beatriz, and Jonathan Morduch. 2005. The Economics of Microfinance. 
Cambridge and London: MIT Press. 
Ault, J. and Spicer, A. 2009. Comparative institutional advantages at the bottom of the pyramid: 
explaining cross-national differences in the growth of commercial microfinance. Working paper.  
Beck, Thorsten, Leora F Klapper, and Juan Carlos. 2008. The typology of partial credit 
guarantee funds around the world. Working Paper. 
Casson, Mark, 1993, “Entrepreneurship,” in the Fortune Encyclopaedia of Economics, (ed. 
David R. Henderson), New York: Warner Books, 1993, 631-4. 
Cook, Michael, and Joel S. Bryce. 2007. A model of a micro-credit institution. Journal of 
Applied Business and Economics: 1-10. 
Cull, Robert, Asli Demirg, and Kunt Jonathan Morduch. 2008. Microfinance meets the market. 
Working Paper. 
Cull, Robert, Asli Demirguc-Kunt, and Jonathan Morduch. 2009. Banks and microbanks. 
Working Paper. 
Cull, Robert, Asli Demirguc-Kunt, and Jonathan Morduch. 2009. Does regulatory supervision 
curtail Microfinance Profitability and Outreach? Working Paper. 
Cull, Robert, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, and Jonathan Morduch. 2009. Microfinance tradeoffs: 
regulation, competition, and financing. Working Paper.  
Delavande, Adeline, Xavier Gine, and David McKenzie. 2009. Measuring subjective 
expectations in developing countries. Working Paper. 
Emeni, Francis Kehinde. 2008. Micro finance institutions (MFIs) in Nigeria: problems and 
prospects : questionnaire survey findings. Financial Management and Analysis 21 (1): 69-76. 
Flannery, Mark, Simon H. Kim, and M. Nimalendran. 2004. Market evidence on the opaqueness 
of banking firms’ assets. Journal of Financial Economics 71: 419-460.  
Hartungi, Rusdy. 1997. Understanding the success factors of micro-finance institution in a 
developing country. International Journal of Social Economics 34 (6): 388-401. 
Hofstede, Geert 1980. Culture’s consequences: international differences in work-related values. 
Beverly Hills: Sage Publications. 
 70 
 
Hudon, Marek. 2008. Norms and values of the various microfinance institutions. International 
Journal of Social Economics 35 (1/2): 35-48. 
Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi, 2003. Governance matters III: 
governance indicators for 1996–2002. World Bank working paper. 
Khandker, S. R. 2005. Microfinance and poverty: evidence using panel data from Bangladesh. 
The World Bank Economic Review 19, no. 2: 263-286.  
Khandker, S.R. 1998. Fighting Poverty With Microcredit: Experience in Bangladesh. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.  
Karnani, A. 2007. The mirage of marketing to the bottom of the pyramid: How the private sector 
can help alleviate poverty. California Management Review, 49: 90-111. 
Koveos, P., and D. Randhawa. 2004. Financial services for the poor: assessing microfinance 
institutions. Managerial Finance 30 (9): 70–95.  
Kyereboah-Coleman, Anthony, and Kofi a. Osei. 2007. Outreach and profitability of 
microfinance institutions: the role of governance. Journal of Economic Studies 35(3): 236-248.  
Kyereboah-Coleman, Anthony. 2006. The impact of capital structure on the performance of 
microfinance institutions. The Journal of Risk Finance 8 (1): 56-71.  
London, T., & Hart, S.L. 2004. Reinventing strategies for emerging markets: Beyond the 
transitional model. Journal of International Business Studies, 35: 350-370. 
McIntosh, C., and B. Wydick. 2005. Competition and microfinance. Journal of Development 
Economics 78 (2): 271–298. 
McKenzie, David. 2009. Impact assessments in finance and private sector development. 
Working Paper Series. 
Mersland, Roy. 2009. Performance and governance in microfinance institutions. Journal of 
Banking & Finance 33: 662-669. 
Moulton, B.R. 1986. Random Group Effects and the Precision of Regression Estimates. Journal 
of Econometrics, 32: 385-397. 
Stiroh, Kevin and Adrienne Rumble. 2006. The dark side of diversification: The case of US 
financial holding companies. Journal of Banking & Finance 30: 2131-2161. 
Tucker, Michael, and Gerard Miles. 2004. Financial Performance of Microfinance Institutions: A 
Comparison to Performance of Regional Commercial Banks by Geographic Regions. Journal of 
Microfinance 6 (1): 41-55. 
 71 
 
Table 2.1: Key differences between traditional banking and microfinance
6
 
 Traditional Banking Microfinance 
Lending 
Competitive interest 
rates; borrowers sensitive 
to rates 
Access to credit more 
important than rate charged, 
high rates prevalent 
Client 
Relationship 
Contractually formal, 
arm's length 
Ongoing intimate knowledge 
of client/business/needs, 
actively collaborative 
relationships 
Loan Security Primarily collateral 
Collective monitoring, trust, 
reputation, nontraditional 
collateral 
Client Base Small Large 
Loan Size Large; minimums apply Very small on average 
Administrative 
Costs 
Proportional Very high 
 
 
  
                                                          
6
 Compiled by authors, source material Koveos and Randhawa, 2004 
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Table 2.2: Common MFI models
7
 
Model Grameen Bank  
Bangladesh 
Rural 
Advancement 
Community 
(BRAC) 
Co-operative Village Bank 
Institutional 
Form 
Licensed Bank Non-
Governmental 
Organization 
(NGO) 
Owner Managed 
Firm 
Limited Bank 
Clientele Poor women, no net 
worth 
Poor households Non-banked 
households  
Rural groups, 
micro-
enterprises 
Loan Type Short duration small 
loans 
Short duration 
small loans 
Members' 
savings 
mobilization 
Rural savings 
mobilization 
Regulation 
of Services 
Mutual assistance 
and monitoring by 
small groups, access 
to legal system 
Group monitoring 
and delivery 
Members are 
owners of entity, 
have interest in 
performance 
Legal 
enforcement 
Funding Financial institutions NGOs Savings 
mobilization 
Financial 
institutions and 
rural savings 
Allocation of 
Funds 
Group procedures 
for screening, 
monitoring 
Socially oriented 
to the needy, a 
priori 
Allocated to 
members, 
mutual 
responsibility 
As per 
traditional 
banking though 
mobile and 
closer to rural 
clients 
 
 
  
                                                          
7
 Source: Koveos and Randhawa, 2004, World Bank Publications, online sources 
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Table 2.3: Sample by Organizational Forms 
year 
Non-
Profit 
(NGO) Bank 
Co-Op or 
Credit 
Union 
Non-Bank 
Financial 
Institution 
Rural 
Bank Other Total 
1997 21 8 2 12 1 0 44 
1998 36 11 5 27 0 1 80 
1999 48 14 9 38 0 1 110 
2000 73 17 17 50 4 3 164 
2001 103 21 49 69 4 8 254 
2002 196 33 77 106 10 11 433 
2003 269 40 110 147 43 16 625 
2004 356 49 129 192 51 16 793 
2005 395 56 160 218 58 16 903 
2006 376 57 151 229 65 14 892 
2007 332 59 154 218 61 20 844 
2008 271 54 134 198 61 18 736 
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Table 2.4: Selected Performance and Outreach Measures 
Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
total assets 6595 3.04e+07 1.92e+08 0 6.45e+09 
active borrowers 6535 51756 326421.2 0 6792978 
depositors 5692 85453 1093258 0 3.23e+07 
pct of women borrowers 5702 66% 28% 0 100% 
avg. loan to GNI per capita 6488 1.466 52.672 0 4236 
borrowers per staff 6505 137 252 0 13709 
operating expense to assets 5249 0.197 0.170 0 2.215 
loan write off percentage 4743 1.7% 5.5% 0 100% 
return on assets 5250 0.75% 13.95% -214% 101% 
 
  
  
 
   7
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Table 2.5: Effects of formal and informal institutions on performance and efficiency measures  
  ROA 
impaired loans 
to assets 
operating 
expense to assets ROA 
impaired loans 
to assets 
operating 
expense to assets 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
control of corruption -0.0164 -0.0045 ** -0.028 
   
 
(0.23) (0.02) (0.19) 
   common law legal origin -0.1006 *** 0.0078 ** 0.1378 *** 
     (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) 
   individualism 
   
-0.0036 * 0.0004 *** 0.0061 *** 
    
(0.06) (0.00) (0.00) 
masculinity 
   
0.0013 0.0002 ** 9.87E-05 
    
(0.36) (0.00) (0.95) 
power distance 
   
0.0011 -5.70E-05 0.001 
    
(0.34) (0.58) (0.28) 
uncertainty avoidance 
   
0.0012 0.0002 0.0008 
  
   
(0.31) (0.21) (0.55) 
roads 0.1002 *** -0.0236 *** -0.3056 *** 0.2525 *** -0.0565 *** -0.5941 *** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
gdp per capita (ppp) -0.0110 *** 0.0014 *** 0.0209 *** -0.0072 -0.0003 0.0181 ** 
  (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.45) (0.67) (0.04) 
age 0.0011 ** -0.0002 ** -0.003 *** 5.60E-04 -0.0003 *** -0.0026 *** 
 
(0.02) (0.02) 0.00 (0.30) (0.01) (0.00) 
debt to equity 0.00001 -0.00008 *** -0.00036 *** 0.00007 -0.00008 *** -0.00029 *** 
 
(0.26) (0.00) (0.01) (0.24) (0.00) (0.00) 
total assets (millions) -3.08E-08 4.17E-06 -5.42E-05 * 1.86E-05 5.23E-06 -8.76E-05 
 
(1.00) (0.17) (0.10) (0.51) (0.22) (0.20) 
for profit  0.014 ** -0.0034 ** -0.0556 *** 0.0215 * -0.0019 -0.0627 *** 
 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.00) (0.08) (0.49) (0.00) 
constant 0.0322 0.0201 *** 0.241 *** -0.1871 0.0039 0.003 
  (0.25) (0.00) (0.00) (0.27) (0.68) (0.98) 
Number of observations 4408 4389 4407 1806 1801 1808 
R-Squared 0.373 0.2541 0.4412 0.5355 0.591 0.7551 
Note: *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 2.6: Effects of formal and informal institutions on outreach measures  
  borrowers 
% women 
borrowers loan size borrowers 
% women 
borrowers loan size 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
control of corruption 10807.95 0.0114 -435.55 
   
 
(0.30) (0.64) (0.19) 
   common law legal origin 57505.53 * 0.1662 *** -765.96 *** 
     (0.09) (0.00)  (0.00)        
individualism       1944.2 *** 0.0051 * -46.63 *** 
    
(0.00)  (0.08) (0.00)  
masculinity 
   
790.27 -0.002 -16.97 
    
(0.13) (0.42) (0.25) 
power distance 
   
-223.35 0.0036 * -31.89 *** 
    
(0.48) (0.09) (0.00)  
uncertainty avoidance 
   
713.17 * -0.0026 -8.56 
    
(0.06) (0.23) (0.31) 
roads 43563.44 -0.235 *** 1522.78 54274.75 -0.2994 * 3554.79 *** 
 
(0.25) (0.00)  (0.17) (0.49) (0.10) (0.00)  
gdp per capita (ppp) -9260 * 0.0019 174.20 ** -8170 ** -0.0020 153.10 ** 
 
(0.06) (0.74) (0.02) (0.05) (0.90) (0.04) 
age 2600 -0.0022 ** 23.10 ***  815.02 * -0.0011 22.57 ** 
 
(0.27) (0.02) (0.00)  (0.08) (0.34) (0.00)  
debt to equity -523 *** -0.0006 *** 1.94 * -485 *** -0.0007 *** 0.8300 ** 
 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.08) (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.02) 
total assets (millions) 1400 ** -0.0001 * 2.60 * 500 *** 0.0000 2.07 
 
(0.03) (0.10) (0.08) (0.01) (0.65) (0.13) 
for profit  -15999.3 -0.1186 *** 244.68 ** 10554.88 -0.1409 *** 120.29 
 
(0.22) (0.00)  (0.03) (0.27) (0.00)  (0.37) 
constant 13715.21 0.7408 *** -305.28 -76500 0.7010 *** 4172.05 *** 
  (0.62) (0.00)  (0.59) (0.31) (0.01) (0.00)  
Number of observations 5273 4634 5251 1957 1791 2123 
R-Squared 0.3497 0.3587 0.2358 0.4256 0.4486 0.5692 
Note: *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively.  
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3.   Market Discipline and Bank Subordinated Debt Yields during the lead up to the 
Financial Crisis 
 
ABSTRACT: 
This paper examines the lack of market discipline in the subordinated debt market of banks 
leading up to the financial crises in 2008. We also investigate why market monitoring and 
discipline appear to wane after 2001 until the financial crisis of 2008.  In general, we find that 
subordinated debt holders were caught off guard by the suddenness and magnitude of the crisis. 
We argue that bank opacity created a vulnerable environment in the banking industry that 
contributed to this collapse. 
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“We conclude this financial crisis was avoidable” - The U.S. Financial Crisis Inquiry 
Commission (2011) 
3.1   INTRODUCTION 
The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) concluded in its January 2011 report 
that the 2008 financial crisis was caused by failures in financial regulation and breakdowns in 
corporate governance.   Empirical evidence
1
 has suggested that market discipline should have at 
least partially contributed to monitoring and managing risk in the absence of effective regulatory 
controls.  However, participants in the unsecured bank debt market apparently failed to recognize 
the signs of growing risk in the banking system
2
. The recent financial crisis provides clear 
evidence that monitoring mechanisms have ether not materialized or have not been sufficient 
(Flannery 2008). 
 This paper examines the lack of market discipline as evidenced by the lack of relationship 
between accounting measures of bank risk and the yield spread in the subordinated debt market 
of banks leading up to the financial crisis in 2008. We also investigate why market discipline 
appear to wane after the economic downturn of 2001 until the financial crisis of 2008.  In 
general, we find that bank subordinated debt-holders were caught off guard by the suddenness 
and magnitude of the crisis. We argue that bank opacity created a vulnerable environment in the 
banking industry that contributed to this collapse. 
Flannery and Sorescu (1996)
3
 argue that the losses to debt claimants during the collapse 
of First Republic Bank Corporation in 1988 softened the perception of the Too Big To Fail 
                                                          
1
 See Bliss and Flannery 2001, Flannery and Rangan, 2008, Morgan and Stiroh 2001, etc., 
2
 These cited causes of the financial crisis are similar to Llewellyn(2002) who cites both 
ineffective regulatory supervision and a lack of market discipline as causes of various banking 
crises in Asia from 1990-1997.  
3
 We replicate methodology of Flannery and Sorescu (1996) to analyze the relationship between 
subordinated debt yield spreads and bank risk.  
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(TBTF) subsidy. This encouraged market participants to once again monitor and discipline the 
risk-taking behavior of banks.
4
 We find that after the resurgence of market discipline in 1991, it 
disappeared after 2001.  Bank opacity may have been a contributing factor to the apparent 
departure of market discipline as an effective method to control risk-taking. The banking 
industry may have appeared less risky to market participants due to obscurity in valuation 
procedures.   
 In this paper we argue that bank opacity has increased over time, which impaired market 
discipline. In some ways, the increased opacity of the banking industry is a greater problem than 
the existence of TBTF.
5
 From a regulator’s perspective, a TBTF institution should require even 
more oversight to ensure its safety because a failure of a TBTF institution could potentially 
trigger a contagion. That is, a lowering of market discipline should be associated with an 
increase in regulatory discipline. An increase in opacity on the other hand would diminish the 
ability of both market participants and regulators to accurately gauge the risk of a bank (Bliss 
2001). The remainder of the paper will proceed as follows. In section 3.2, we briefly discuss the 
literature on market discipline in the banking industry and develop our hypotheses.   Section 3.3 
describes the data and methodology. Section 3.4 presents and discusses the results.  Section 3.5 
concludes. 
3.2   LITERATURE REVIEW AND BACKGROUND 
In an efficient market, prices reflect relevant information collected, analyzed, and 
disseminated by market participants.   In the bank subordinated debentures market, if a bank’s 
risk increases, yields should rise. Effective market discipline requires two conditions: 
                                                          
4
 However, Solidad, Peria and Shmukler (2001) show that safety nets do not diminish market 
discipline. 
5
 Jones et al, 2010 find opaque assets decreases charter value and thereby decreasing yet another 
avenue of discipline. 
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1) Market participants monitor banks’ behavior, which allows them to collect and 
update their information set.  
2) Market participants act rationally in regards to new information such that the 
price of the bond reflects this new information.   
If these conditions hold, market discipline will affect the cost of debt for a given bank. However, 
this discipline may not actually influence the bank’s behavior (Bliss and Flannery, 2001; 
Krishnan et al. 2005).   For example, a bank may take more risk if it does not increase its 
perceived likelihood of bankruptcy.  This could be especially true for banks considered to be 
TBTF that are likely to be rescued by regulators during times of financial turmoil.  Regardless, if 
the perception from market participants is that a TBTF subsidy exists, they may choose not to 
discipline the banks for excessive risk-taking. 
Flannery and Sorescu (1996) indicate that the implicit TBTF status hindered market 
discipline. They found insignificant relationship between bank risk measures and the 
subordinated debt yield spreads to treasury from 1983 to 1988. However, bank regulators made it 
increasingly clear by the late 1980s and early 1990s that bank subordinated debt holders were not 
protected by removing the implicit guarantee of TBTF policy. Flannery and Sorescu (1996) 
found that from 1988 to 1991, the yield spread was positively correlated to bank-specific risk 
measures. Still, the perception of TBTF could change over time; thus, there is no guarantee that 
it may not reappear again in later periods. 
Regardless of the TBTF subsidy, the first condition for effective market discipline is that 
market participants can actually monitor the banks. Over the last two decades, banks have 
evolved into more complex organizations that engage in a wider array of business activities.  
Banks have always been considered relatively opaque because loans - their primary asset - are 
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opaque in nature to market participants outside the bank that do not have the private information 
collected by the banks on their counterparty. However, banks have become much more opaque 
recently (Gu 2010) due to the growth of off balance sheet activities and trading activities such as 
high-risk mortgage backed securities (MBS) and other collateralized debt obligations (CDOs).
6
 
As opacity increases, market participants’ ability to monitor bank risk may diminish due 
to their inability to effectively price, or in some cases even identify, the liabilities and assets of 
the bank. In this case, if the first assumption is not satisfied, then market discipline will likely be 
ineffective regardless of the market’s perception of the TBTF subsidy.  
 In the official FCIC report, the commission states that there was a lack of regulatory 
enforcement and that rating agencies did not fully measure the risks involved.  This conclusion is 
consistent with the assertion that opacity impaired both regulators and rating agencies. If these 
two groups could not gauge bank risk, it would have been even more difficult for market 
participants to do so. Based on this discussion, we offer the following three hypotheses. 
H1: Bank opacity has increased over time. 
H2: The relationship that bank specific risk has on subordinated debt spreads weakens 
over time. 
H3: Opacity and not TBTF is the primary reason for the lack of market discipline leading 
up to the financial crisis in 2008.  
3.3   DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
3.3.1   Sources of Data 
Accounting risk measures of banks and all opaque asset measures were constructed from 
data gathered from FRY-9C quarterly reports from 1994 to 2008. New debt issues were collected 
                                                          
6
 This is consistent with the view that opacity is a consequence of inherent complexity and nature 
of the underlying assets (Jones, et al. 2010). 
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from Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum New Issues Database (SDC) to identify BHCs and FHCs 
and matched with transactions data from the National Association of Insurance Commissioners 
(NAIC). NAIC data provides us with the investment activities of life/accident/health, 
property/casualty, title, fraternal and health companies, from which subordinated debt spreads 
are calculated. Finally, we pulled yields for the subordinated debts from Bloomberg to verify the 
consistency of our NAIC data
7
.  
3.3.2   Variable Definitions 
To test our three hypotheses, we identify and categorize specific bank assets as opaque.
8
 
We construct three loan variables, all scaled by total assets.  The three variables are labeled 
REAL_LOANS, OTHER_LOANS and TOTAL_LOANS. REAL_LOANS represent the summation 
of all residential and non-residential real estate loans divided by total assets. TOTAL_LOANS are 
simply the bank’s total loans divided by total assets. OTHER_LOANS is the difference between 
TOTAL_LOANS and REAL_LOANS. The variables MBS and ABS represent mortgage-backed 
and asset-backed securities, respectively, that are not guaranteed by any government agency or 
government sponsored enterprise.  Both of these variables are also scaled by total assets. 
Mortgage-backed and asset-backed securities issued by GSEs are not classified as opaque assets 
and therefore are not included in the analysis.  
We construct a variable called HIGH_OPAQUE which is the sum of the variables MBS 
and ABS, as well as other trading assets, intangible assets, and investments in unconsolidated 
subsidiaries, all divided by total assets. As stated earlier, MBS and ABS are both securitized 
assets and are characterized as being very opaque. CDOs, which for banks are primarily made up 
of resecuritized MBSs and ABSs, increasingly become a larger part of trading assets along with 
                                                          
7
 The NAIC and Bloomberg data were similar in most cases.  
8
 See appendix for a full listing of FR Y-9C line items used to construct bank specific variables. 
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other hybrid financial instruments. Intangible assets are by definition opaque because they are 
non-monetary assets that cannot be physically measured while accounting treatment of 
investments in unconsolidated subsidiaries makes them opaque
9
. The variable 
OTHER_OPAQUE is the sum of premises and fixed assets, goodwill, other assets and other real 
estate owned, divided by total assets. We distinguish between HIGH_OPAQUE and 
OTHER_OPAQUE because the HIGH_OPAQUE are more complex and harder to price. 
Summary statistics of BHC asset composition over time (Table 3.1) as well as graphs of select 
opaque asset classes (Figures 3.1 – 3.6) support our hypothesis that opacity has increased over 
time.  
We test for the presence of market discipline in the subordinated debt market during the 
period of 1994 – 2007. We build on the methodology used by Flannery and Sorescu (1996). Our 
data offer a higher frequency (quarterly observations instead of yearly observations). As with 
Flannery and Sorescu, we use fixed effects panel regressions controlling for both firm and time 
effects to test our second hypothesis. Specifically, by using the same variables, we replicate their 
main results in their table 3, without trying to reproduce their later tables which look at 
alternative measures of bank specific risk (theoretical measure of fair default premium), linearity 
assumption of the model. Below is the model we utilize.  
                                                            
                                    (1) 
                                                          
9
 Financial statements of subsidiaries where the BHC has between 20% and 50% common equity 
voting rights are not included in the consolidated financial statements of the BHC. Instead, this 
type of subsidiary appears as a line item investment where the initial investment is recorded at 
book value and adjustments are made based on proportional profits or loss reported by the 
subsidiary. Therefore the risk profile of the subsidiary is not disclosed. 
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The dependent variable, SPREAD is the difference between the yield of subordinated 
debt and the yield of a treasury bond with the closest maturity. The independent variables are 
classified as bank specific risk measures. An increase in any of the risk measures are expected to 
increase the spread between subordinated debt and treasure yields. NATA is the ratio of 
nonaccruing loans to total assets. PDTA is the ratio of accruing loans that are at least 90 days 
past due to total assets. OREOTA is the ratio of other real estate owned to total assets. MKTLEV 
is the market leverage and is constructed as the ratio of book value of total liabilities divided by 
the sum of market value of common stock outstanding and the book value of preferred stock. 
AGAP is the absolute value of the bank’s one-year maturity gap divided by market value of 
equity.  The maturity gap is the difference in the amount of assets and liabilities that are maturing 
or repricing within one year. ROA is used as a contra-risk measure and it is calculated as net 
income divided by total assets. It is expected to have a negative relationship with SPREAD. 
Finally we use the log of total assets, lnTA, to control for bank size effects, and the year dummy 
variables capture inter temporal variations that may affect the spread. 
Severe multicollinearity prevents us from using opacity measures and risk measures in 
the same model. Specifically, we see strong multicollinearity between the HIGH_OPAQUE 
measure and MKTLEV as well as between HIGH_OPAQUE and lnTA. This is consistent with the 
view that larger banks increasingly engaged in leveraged securitization. As an alternative, we run 
our analysis on subsamples of BHCs based on size. 
To test if opacity was driving our results, we screen out the TBTF
10
 banks and rerun the 
fixed effects panel regression model from equation 1 above. Because larger banks have more 
                                                          
10
 We identify the ten largest commercial banks based on the average total assets throughout the 
sample period and categorize these banks as TBTF. The top five banks are consistently in the top 
6 every quarter. Classifying only the top five banks as TBTF yields similar results. 
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issuances of subordinated debt securities, TBTF banks represent 64.55% of the individual 
subordinated debt observations and account for 33.48% of the banks in our sample. If we do not 
observe a positive relationship between our risk measures and SPREAD, then there is no 
evidence of market discipline in the smaller banks and we can conclude that TBTF was not the 
key factor impeding market discipline during the run up to the financial crisis.  
3.3.3   Summary Statistics 
Table 3.1 shows the summary statistics of all variables used in our analysis. It is divided 
into two panels with the first showing the summary statistics for TBTF banks and the second for 
other banks. The summary statistics indicate that TBTF banks on average have loans that 
constitute 50.9% of their total assets. This is about 14.5 percentage points less than the 65.3% of 
total assets for non-TBTF banks, and this difference is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Two other variables that show dramatic differences are HIGH_OPAQUE and MKTLEV.  TBTF 
banks have substantially higher market leverage and a greater portion of their total assets are 
highly opaque. HIGH_OPAQUE is primarily composed of trading assets which include CDOs. 
During the 2005 to 2008 period, the issuance and trading of CDOs increased greatly. Although 
MBS accounts for less than 1% for TBTF, this figure could be misleading.  Since MBS 
increasingly became the main underlying asset for CDOs, much of its value is likely captured in 
the trading assets measure. As banks repackaged securitized assets and created derivatives of 
derivatives, the line items for MBS became underreported.  
[Insert Table 3.1 Here] 
3.4 RESULTS 
3.4.1   Hypothesis 1 
[Insert Figure 3.1 Here] 
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To investigate our first hypothesis, we look at the changing asset composition of banks 
across time in our sample. In Figure 3.1 we see evidence that total opaque assets increased 
relative to total assets from 1994 to 2008.  This indicates that banks have shifted their allocation 
towards opaque assets. Figures 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 subcategorize the opaque assets into 
TOTAL_LOANS, HIGH_OPAQUE, and OTHER_OPAQUE assets. Although many assets may 
be opaque, the degree of opacity varies.  Looking at Figures 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4 together, we notice 
that TOTAL_LOANS decline as a percentage of total assets while both HIGH_OPAQUE and 
OTHER_OPAQUE increase. This pattern indicates that banks are not only shifting from 
transparent assets to opaque assets, but the composition of opaque assets is shifting from less 
opaque to more opaque.  
[Insert Figure 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4 Here] 
Figure 3.5 shows that real estate loans grew steadily as a percentage of total assets, while 
the ratio of total loans to total assets declined.  This pattern is consistent with the real estate 
bubble.  Finally, Figure 3.6 shows the percentage of total opaque assets to total assets for all 
BHCs that file FRY-9C reports.  We do this to verify that the pattern we see is not isolated to just 
the banks in our sample.  The similarity between Figure 3.6 and Figure 3.1 indicates that banks 
became more opaque.  
[Insert Figures 3.5 and 3.6 Here] 
3.4.2   Hypothesis 2 
We investigate the measure of perceived risk in the bank subordinated debt market by 
comparing the yield spread to treasury and the yield across each year of our sample. Table 3.2 
panel A shows the summary statistics for the spread between the yield of the subordinated debt 
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and a treasury bond with a similar maturity
11
. Panel B shows the actual yield of the subordinated 
debt.  Figure 3.7 illustrates the data in Table 3.2.  Prior to 2001, the average yield was never 
below 6.5%. From 2002 onwards, the yield never surpasses 5.5%.  
The yield spread is relatively stable between 1995 and 2000.  In 2001 and 2002, the yield 
spread rises in response to the slowing economy and the tragic events of September 11, 2001 as 
investors retreated to safer treasuries in face of growing uncertainty. After 2002, we see a steady 
decline in the yield spreads, reaching their lowest point in our sample in 2006 right before the 
bursting of the real estate bubble.  In 2007, we witness a spike in yields in reaction to the credit 
crises in the investment banking industry.  Finally in 2008, the continued deterioration of the 
health of the financial sector and confidence in the banking industry led to another drastic rise in 
subordinated debt yields.    
[Insert Table 3.2 and Figure 3.7 Here] 
Motivated by the above observations, we investigate the presence of market discipline in 
two separate time periods, 1994 to 2001 and 2002 to 2007. Although we show 2008 data in the 
summary statistics and in previous graphs, we do not include it in our regression analysis. Our 
primary objective is to see if market participants disciplined banks during the run up to the 2008 
financial crisis.  
[Insert Table 3.3 Here] 
Table 3.3 reports the results of our fixed effects panel regressions on all sample banks.  
Column 1 examines the quarterly data from 1994 to 2007. Columns 2 and 3 show the 1994 to 
                                                          
11
 10-year treasury notes and 30-year treasury bonds are issued every quarter on the 15
th
 of 
February, May, August, and November.  2-year to 7-year treasury notes are issued every month 
either on the 15
th
 or the end of the month. We match subordinated debt by quarter. This means 
that the most the maturities between a treasury security and subordinated debt will be off is 15 
days for maturities less than 7 years and 45 days for longer maturities. We also censor out all 
observations with subordinated debt maturities of less than one year. 
 88 
 
2001 and 2002 to 2007 sub periods, respectively.  The results in column 1 show that NATA and 
MKLEV are both positive and highly significant as expected.  The performance measure of ROA 
is negative and significant, also consistent with expectations. All else equal, better performing 
banks should be at less risk of default. The other three risk variables (PDTA, OREOTA, and 
AGAP) show mixed signs but are all insignificant. The control variable for size, lnTA, is negative 
and significant at the 10% level. This indicates that there seems to be a minor perception that 
larger banks are less likely to default on their subordinated debt obligations.  Overall, these 
results indicate the presence of market discipline over the entire sample period from 1994 – 
2007. 
When we divide our sample, the results become stronger. In column 2, NATA and 
MKTLEV are once again significantly positive. In addition, AGAP is significantly positive, 
indicating that interest rate risk caused by the short term maturity mismatch between liabilities 
and assets are being priced into the subordinated debt market. The remaining two risk measures, 
PDTA and OREOTA, are not significant but unlike the first column, they show consistent 
positive signs. ROA remains negative and significant although the coefficient is much smaller. 
The results of column 2 show stronger evidence of market discipline than the first column.  Also 
notice that size of the bank no longer influences the yield spread. 
Looking at the later period leading up to the 2008 financial crisis, we see that only ROA 
is consistent with expectations.  All of the other risk measures are either insignificant, or the 
signs are in the wrong direction.  AGAP stands out as it is negative and highly significant at less 
than 1%.  This indicates that market participants actually reward banks that increase their interest 
rate sensitivity risk. We also notice that lnTA is again negatively related to SPREAD. This 
indicates that during the later period, larger banks were viewed as safer.  Market participants 
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rewarded good performance but did not punish increased risk.  Overall, these results do not show 
strong evidence of market discipline of banks during the period leading up to the financial crisis. 
[Insert Table 3.4 Here] 
Table 3.4 shows the results of annual cross-sectional OLS regressions. The results are 
less consistent but looking at the two sub-periods, we can draw similar inferences as from the 
results in Table 3.3. Counting the number of risk variable coefficients that are significant and in 
the expected direction, we see from 1995 to 2001, there are 18 with only 3 that are significant 
and in the wrong direction. In contrast, from 2002 to 2007, there are 11 risk coefficients that are 
significant and in the expected direction but there are 9 that are significant and in the wrong 
direction. In addition, during the earlier period, lnTA is never significant while it is significantly 
negative 5 out of the 6 years from 2002 to 2007, indicating that the perception of the TBTF 
subsidy may have returned. Examining each year in turn, the coefficients are significantly in the 
wrong direction more often than not from 2004 to 2007. 
3.4.3   Hypothesis 3 
The results up to now indicate that opacity increased during the latter half of our sample 
and evidence of market discipline seems to disappear.  These results may be coincidental, or they 
may suggest that opacity is a proxy for other factors that could be causing the lack of market 
discipline.  Flannery and Sorescu (1996) suggest the TBTF subsidy is the cause. Our own 
analysis also shows that there are strong correlations between our variables HIGH_OPACITY 
and lnTA.  To test whether opacity or TBTF is the source of the lack of market discipline from 
2002 to 2007, we rerun our analysis looking at two subsamples. In the first subsample, we 
remove the TBTF banks and look only at the remaining banks.  If TBTF is dampening market 
participants’ incentive to discipline banks, this incentive should still be present for banks not 
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deemed as TBTF.  Table 3.5 column 1 shows the results for the banks that are not considered 
TBTF. The only risk measure that is significant with the expected sign is MKTLEV at the 10% 
level.  AGAP is negative and significant at the 1% level.  Overall, little evidence of market 
discipline exists in this subgroup. 
[Insert Table 3.5 Here] 
A possible explanation for the results in column 1 is that the TBTF subsidy has a 
spillover or “contagion” effect on other banks that are not TBTF.   If the perception of the TBTF 
subsidy is in place, then the perception of this contagion risk is lowered. Therefore, the non-
TBTF banks would at the very least face less contagion risk. To show further support for 
hypothesis 3, we introduce a new variable, LEAST_OPAQUE, which classifies the banks that are 
in the bottom quartile based on their average HIGH_OPACITY measure. In column 2 we regress 
only on the subsample of banks classified as LEAST_OPAQUE. In column 3 we regress on all 
other banks in our sample. The results in column 2 indicate that less opaque banks are subject to 
market discipline while the more opaque banks are not (Column 3). In column 2, three of the risk 
measures are positive and significant and ROA is negative and significant. Although PDTA and 
AGAP are negative, they are not significant. In column 3 we find only one significant risk 
variable, AGAP, and the sign is in the wrong direction. Overall, Table 3.5 strongly supports H3. 
3.4.4   Robustness 
 For robustness purposes, we verify that our results are consistent when we include other 
potential explanatory variables (Table 3.6) as well as when we use alternative measures of loan 
quality (Table 3.7 and Table 3.8). In Table 3.6, we include subordinated debt issue 
characteristics. Specifically, we include the coupon rate of the subordinated debt as well at time 
to maturity. Both COUPON and TTM are highly significant and positively associated with 
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SPREAD in all three models. However, even with the inclusion of these variables, our results are 
very consistent with Table 3.3. In the full sample, NATA, MKTLEV, and ROA are all significant 
and in the expected direction just like the results in Table 3.3. From 1994 to 2001, NATA, AGAP, 
MKTLEV, and ROA are all significant and in the correct direction just like column 2 of Table 3.3. 
In the sub period of 2002 to 2007, ROA is in the expected direction and significant. The only 
difference is PDTA is significant and in the wrong direction instead of AGAP as in Table 3.3. 
However, these two variables are consistent in direction in both tables. Overall we see evidence 
of market discipline in our sample from 1994 to 2001 and see little evidence from 2002 to 2007. 
 In Table 3.7, we substitute in ALLTA, allowance for loan and lease losses minus 
recoveries to total assets, for NATA, PDTA, and OREOTA. Net allowance is a write down of 
assets as banks conclude that some value of assets will not be recovered. Therefore this is an 
alternative measure of loan and lease quality to NATA, PDTA and OREOTA. The results in Table 
3.7 once again are consistent with the results from Table 3.3. For the full sample, MKTLEV and 
ROA are significant and in the correct direction. For 1994 to 2001 period, AGAP, MKTLEV and 
ROA are significant and in the correct direction. For the latter part of our sample, only ROA is in 
the expected direction and significant. Both ALLTA and AGAP are significant and in the wrong 
direction. Once again, there is little evidence of market discipline from 2002 to 2007.  
Finally, in Table 3.8, we report the results using all for measures of loan quality, ALLTA, 
NATA, PDTA, and OREOTA. The results for the full sample are less consistent than in the 
previous tables. NATA, MKTLEV and ROA are significant and in the expected direction, but 
ALLTA is in the opposite direction and significant at the 10% level. However, looking at the 
earlier and later sub periods, we find consistent results with previous tables. From 1994 to 2001, 
NATA, AGAP, MKTLEV and ROA are all significant and in the expected direction. PDTA, 
 92 
 
OREOTA, and ALLTA are also in the expected direction but not statistically significant. From 
2002 to 2007, ALLTA and AGAP are significant and in the opposite direction of expectations. 
Again we see evidence of market discipline in our early sample period but little evidence of 
market discipline in our later period leading up to the financial crisis.   
3.5 CONCLUSION 
This paper contributes to the literature in two distinct ways.  First, we extend the work of 
Flannery and Sorescu (1996) by expanding the sample period and utilizing higher frequency 
data.  We find results consistent with the view that the increased opacity in the banking industry 
contributed to the lack of market discipline observed during the build up to the 2008 financial 
crisis. We show that opacity’s impact on market discipline is a unique factor that is independent 
of the impact that TBTF can have on the incentive of market participants to discipline banks.  
These results imply that market discipline is not a suitable substitute to regulatory 
discipline in an opaque banking market. The calls for regulators to incorporate more market 
information (Berger et al. 2000; Flannery 1998 2001; Krainer and Lopez 2004) into their 
analysis of the banks they are charged with may be flawed.
12
 The assumption is that regulators 
can improve their assessment of banks by incorporating market signals. However there is also an 
unstated assumption that the banks are transparent enough for the market to gauge their levels of 
risk accurately.  This seems not to be the case. Regulators and policy makers need to limit 
opacity and promote transparency in the banking industry (Stiroh 2006). Only then will the 
incorporation of market signals improve regulators’ assessment of banks.  
                                                          
12
 In fact, some (Hamalainen2004; Pop 2009) have argued for mandatory subordinated debt 
issuances by banks to expose them to market discipline. Basel II also emphasizes the importance 
of market discipline as a way to make banks more sensitive to risk. 
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Appendix A: Opacity Variable Definitions 
 
Total Assets Total inflation-adjusted assets BHCK2170 
Real Loans 
Commercial and residential real estate 
loans and leases, net 
BHCK1410 
Total Loans Total Loans BHCK2122 
Other Loans All other loans, net Total Loans - Real Loans 
ABS 
Asset Backed Securities classified as 
available-for-sale (AFT) or held-to-
maturity (HTM) that are not issued or 
guaranteed by government agencies or 
government sponsored enterprises 
BHCKB838 + BHCKB842 + 
BHCKB846 + BHCKB850 + 
BHCKB854 + BHCKB858 + 
BHCKB841 + BHCKB845 + 
BHCKB849 + BHCKB853 + 
BHCKB587 + BHCKB861 
(2001 - 2005) 
BHCKC026 + BHCKC027 
(2006 - 2008) 
MBS 
Mortgage Backed Securities classified 
as available-for-sale (AFT) or held-to-
maturity (HTM) that are not issued or 
guaranteed by government agencies or 
government sponsored enterprises 
BHCK1709 + BHCK1733 + 
BHCK1736 
Trading All other trading assets BHCK3545 - (MBS + ABS) 
Goodwill Goodwill BHCK3163 
IIUS 
Investments in unconsolidated 
subsidiaries 
BHCK2130 
Intangible Intangible assets 
BHCK3164 + BHCK5506 + 
BHCK5507 (1994 - 1998) 
BHCK3164 + BHCKB026 + 
BHCK5507 (1999 - 2000) 
BHCK0426 (2001 - 2008) 
OREO Other real estate owned 
BHCK2744 + BHCK2745 
(1994 - 2000) 
BHCK2150 (2001 - 2008) 
Other Assets All other assets BHCK2160 
Premises Total premises and fixed assets BHCK2145 
HIGH OPAQUE 
Sub category of opaque assets deemed 
to have high opacity 
MBS + ABS + Trading + 
Intangible + IIUS 
OTHER OPAQUE 
Sub category of opaque assets that are 
nether HIGH OPAQUE or loans 
Premises + Goodwill + Other 
Assets + OREO 
TOTAL OPAQUE All opaque assets 
Total loans + High Opaque + 
Other Opaque 
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Appendix B: Accounting Risk Variable Definitions 
 
ALLTA 
Net allowance for loan and lease 
losses to total assets 
(BHCK4635 - BHCK4605) / BHCK2170 
MKTLEV Market leverage 
BHCK2948 / (market value of common 
shares outstanding + BHCK3283) 
NATA Non-accruing loans to total assets BHCK5526 / BHCK2170 
OREOTA OREO divided by total assets OREO / BHCK2170 
PDTA 
Loans that are greater than 90 days 
past due to total assets 
BHCK5525 / BHCK2170 
ROA Return on assets BHCK4340 / BHCK2170 
SHORT
13
 
Net value of assets and liabilities 
subject to maturity or repricing 
within one year 
(BHCK3365 + BHCK3545 + BHCK1292 
+ BHCK1296 + BHCK 3197 + 
BHCK0383) - (BHCK3298 + 
BHDMA242 + BHFNA245 + 
BHCK3548 + BHCK2332 + BHCK3408 
+ BHCK3409) 
AGAP 
Maturity gap between short term 
assets and short term liabilities 
Abs |SHORT| / (market value of common 
shares outstanding + BHCK3283) 
 
 
  
                                                          
13
 Our construction of SHORT is slightly different from Flannery and James (1984) because they 
use line items from the FDIC’s Report of Conditions and Income (Call Report) while we use line 
items from the FR Y-9C. Alternatively we calculated SHORT = BHCK3197 – (BHCK3296 + 
BHCK3298 + BHCK3408 + BHCK3409) which comes from the interest rate sensitivity table of 
the FR Y-9C. Results are consistent under both definitions. 
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Figure 3.1:  Total Opaque Assets to Total Assets 
 
Shows the mean percentage composition of Total Assets accounted for by opaque assets over 
time from 1994 to 2008. There is presence of a positive trend as opaque assets represents 
approximately 73% of total assets in 1994 and represents almost 82% of total assets by 2008. 
The sample consists of 3360 bank-quarter observations. 
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Figure 3.2:  Total Loans to Total Assets 
 
Shows the mean percentage composition of Total Assets accounted for by loans over time from 
1994 to 2008. There is presence of a positive trend from 1994 to 2001 but in the latter half of our 
sample, this trend disappears. Overall, loans represent approximately the same amount of total 
assets in 1994 and 2008. The sample consists of 3360 bank-quarter observations. 
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Figure 3.3:  High Opaque Assets to Total Assets 
 
Shows the mean percentage composition of Total Assets accounted for by high opaque assets 
(MBS + ABS + other trading assets + intangible assets + investments in unconsolidated 
subsidiaries) over time from 1994 to 2008. There is presence of a negative trend as high opaque 
assets represents approximately 12.5% of total assets in 1994 and represents less than 8% by 
2000. The trend becomes positive in the latter half of our sample as high opaque assets more than 
double to almost 17% of total assets by 2008. The sample consists of 3360 bank-quarter 
observations. 
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Figure 3.4:  Other Opaque Assets to Total Assets 
 
Shows the mean percentage composition of Total Assets accounted for by other opaque assets 
(premises + goodwill + other assets + OREO) over time from 1994 to 2008. There is presence of 
a positive trend as other opaque assets represents approximately 6% of total assets in 1994 and 
represents approximately 10.5% by 2008. The sample consists of 3360 bank-quarter 
observations. 
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Figure 3.5:  Real Estate Loans to Total Assets 
 
Shows the mean percentage composition of Total Assets accounted for by real estate loans over 
time from 1994 to 2008. There is presence of a positive trend as real estate loans represents 
approximately 22% of total assets in 1994 and almost 30% by 2008. In conjunction with Figure 
3.2, the composition of total loans shifts towards real estate loans over our sample period. The 
sample consists of 3360 bank-quarter observations. 
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Figure 3.6:  Total Opaque Assets to Total Assets (All FRY-9C Banks) 
 
Shows the mean percentage composition of Total Assets accounted for by opaque assets over 
time from 1994 to 2008. There is presence of a positive trend as opaque assets represents 
approximately 62.5% of total assets in 1994 and represents almost 80% of total assets by 2008. 
This pattern is very similar to the pattern shown in Figure 3.1, indicating that the positive trend 
of opaque assets to total assets is not isolated to our sample banks. The sample consists of 
108,867 bank-quarter observations. 
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Figure 3.7:  Spreads and Yields on bank subordinated debentures 
 
Shows the mean and median yields and spreads over treasury of subordinated bank debt over 
time from 1994 to 2008. Subordinated debt yields are higher in the earlier half of our sample as it 
never drops below 6% while it is never above 5.5% in the later half. Yield spread rise from 2000 
to 2002 and then steadily falls until 2008. The sample consists of 3360 bank-quarter 
observations. Figure 3.7 corresponds directly with Table 3.2, Panel A and B. 
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics 
 
REAL LOANS is all real estate loans to total assets. OTHER LOANS represents the difference 
between TOTAL LOANS and REAL LOANS to total assets. MBS represents all mortgage backed 
securities not guaranteed by a government sponsored entity to total assets. HIGH OPAQUE 
represents the sum of MBS, ABS, other trading assets, intangible assets, and investments in 
unconsolidated subsidiaries divided by total assets. OTHER OPAQUE represents the sum of 
premises, goodwill, other assets, and OREO divided by total assets. SPREAD is the percentage 
spread between bank subordinated debt yields and the yield of a treasury security with a similar 
maturity. NATA represent non-accruing loans to total assets. PDTA represents loans that are 
greater than 90 days past due to total assets. OREOTA represents other real estate owned to total 
assets. MKTLEV is the market leverage and is constructed as the ratio of book value of total 
liabilities divided by the sum of market value of common stock outstanding and the book value 
of preferred stock. AGAP is the absolute value of the bank’s one-year maturity gap divided by 
market value of equity.
14
 ROA is calculated as net income divided by total assets. Natural log of 
total assets is represented as lnTA. Panel A shows the summary statistics for banks classified as 
too big to fail. Panel B shows the summary statistics for all other banks in our sample. 
 
  
                                                          
14
 See Flannery and James (1984) for additional information on the construction of AGAP. 
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Panel A: TBTF = 1 
  N 
 
Mean 
 
Median 
 
Minimum 
 
Maximum 
 
Std Dev 
REAL LOANS 2169 
 
22.57% 
 
24.34% 
 
0.85% 
 
49.69% 
 
12.25% 
OTHER LOANS 2169 
 
28.30% 
 
25.80% 
 
13.35% 
 
54.77% 
 
8.91% 
MBS 2169 
 
0.86% 
 
0.31% 
 
0.00% 
 
5.36% 
 
1.20% 
HIGH OPAQUE 2169 
 
17.56% 
 
14.77% 
 
1.80% 
 
54.42% 
 
10.32% 
OTHER OPAQUE 2169 
 
9.09% 
 
9.59% 
 
3.86% 
 
14.30% 
 
2.09% 
SPREAD 2169 
 
2.16% 
 
1.89% 
 
-2.43% 
 
8.56% 
 
1.34% 
NATA 2169 
 
0.53% 
 
0.43% 
 
0.11% 
 
2.59% 
 
0.35% 
PDTA 2169 
 
0.22% 
 
0.12% 
 
0.00% 
 
1.78% 
 
0.27% 
OREOTA 2169 
 
0.14% 
 
0.09% 
 
0.00% 
 
1.59% 
 
0.17% 
MKTLEV 2169 
 
820.6% 
 
681.7% 
 
281.6% 
 
3972.1% 
 
420.8% 
AGAP 2169 
 
168.0% 
 
150.5% 
 
14.7% 
 
752.1% 
 
99.6% 
ROA 2169 
 
0.61% 
 
0.58% 
 
-4.20% 
 
2.18% 
 
0.49% 
lnTA 2169 
 
19.979 
 
19.993 
 
18.096 
 
21.581 
 
0.832 
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Table 3.1 Continued 
 
Panel B: TBTF = 0 
  N 
 
Mean 
 
Median 
 
Minimum 
 
Maximum 
 
Std Dev 
REAL LOAN 1191 
 
30.51% 
 
29.94% 
 
1.28% 
 
58.58% 
 
12.71% 
OTHER LOAN 1191 
 
34.75% 
 
35.01% 
 
10.54% 
 
60.42% 
 
10.83% 
MBS 1191 
 
1.17% 
 
0.50% 
 
0.00% 
 
18.68% 
 
2.21% 
HIGH OPAQUE 1191 
 
4.34% 
 
3.03% 
 
0.09% 
 
30.13% 
 
4.38% 
OTHER OPAQUE 1191 
 
8.26% 
 
7.52% 
 
2.64% 
 
26.39% 
 
3.47% 
SPREAD 1191 
 
2.29% 
 
1.99% 
 
-1.59% 
 
12.13% 
 
1.32% 
NATA 1191 
 
0.54% 
 
0.43% 
 
0.02% 
 
2.26% 
 
0.39% 
PDTA 1191 
 
0.20% 
 
0.16% 
 
0.00% 
 
1.70% 
 
0.17% 
OREOTA 1191 
 
0.10% 
 
0.06% 
 
0.00% 
 
0.75% 
 
0.13% 
MKTLEV 1191 
 
602.1% 
 
524.7% 
 
167.3% 
 
3281.7% 
 
297.6% 
AGAP 1191 
 
168.8% 
 
156.4% 
 
2.5% 
 
1693.3% 
 
121.5% 
ROA 1191 
 
0.81% 
 
0.73% 
 
-2.65% 
 
3.08% 
 
0.49% 
lnTA 1191 
 
18.046 
 
18.114 
 
15.378 
 
19.583 
 
0.670 
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Table 3.2: Yearly Summary Statistics for Spread and Yield 
 
Panel A shows the summary statistics over time for the spread over treasury of subordinated 
bank debt over time from 1994 to 2008. Yield spread rise from 2000 to 2002 and then steadily 
falls until 2008. Panel B shows the summary statistics for bank subordinated debt yields, which 
are higher in the earlier half of our sample as it never drops below 6% while it is never above 
5.5% in the later half. Figure 3.7 corresponds directly with Table 3.2, Panel A and B. 
Panel A: Spread (%)  
Year 
 
N 
 
Mean 
 
Median 
 
Minimum 
 
Maximum 
 
Std Dev 
1994 
 
179 
 
3.34 
 
3.33 
 
1.04 
 
6.59 
 
0.69 
1995 
 
270 
 
1.63 
 
1.54 
 
-0.37 
 
5.79 
 
0.70 
1996 
 
255 
 
1.89 
 
1.85 
 
-1.59 
 
5.18 
 
0.61 
1997 
 
264 
 
1.79 
 
1.74 
 
0.29 
 
4.05 
 
0.50 
1998 
 
219 
 
1.50 
 
1.31 
 
0.26 
 
3.93 
 
0.64 
1999 
 
141 
 
1.94 
 
1.90 
 
0.92 
 
3.25 
 
0.46 
2000 
 
92 
 
1.27 
 
1.21 
 
0.22 
 
2.38 
 
0.48 
2001 
 
228 
 
2.74 
 
2.62 
 
0.57 
 
5.66 
 
1.11 
2002 
 
256 
 
3.70 
 
3.85 
 
0.85 
 
6.05 
 
1.04 
2003 
 
263 
 
2.97 
 
3.02 
 
-2.43 
 
6.70 
 
1.31 
2004 
 
278 
 
2.94 
 
2.88 
 
0.67 
 
6.32 
 
1.11 
2005 
 
244 
 
1.51 
 
1.40 
 
-0.64 
 
5.67 
 
0.69 
2006 
 
244 
 
0.55 
 
0.51 
 
-0.88 
 
2.61 
 
0.44 
2007 
 
228 
 
1.03 
 
0.95 
 
-0.91 
 
3.89 
 
0.82 
2008 
 
199 
 
3.93 
 
3.50 
 
1.22 
 
12.13 
 
1.68 
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Table 3.2 Continued 
 
Panel B: Yield (%) 
Year 
 
N 
 
Mean 
 
Median 
 
Minimum 
 
Maximum 
 
Std Dev 
1994 
 
179 
 
7.65 
 
7.74 
 
4.70 
 
10.10 
 
0.86 
1995 
 
270 
 
7.33 
 
7.22 
 
5.15 
 
11.31 
 
0.77 
1996 
 
255 
 
7.00 
 
7.00 
 
3.37 
 
10.33 
 
0.64 
1997 
 
264 
 
7.02 
 
6.95 
 
5.57 
 
9.25 
 
0.47 
1998 
 
219 
 
6.51 
 
6.43 
 
5.19 
 
8.46 
 
0.57 
1999 
 
141 
 
6.78 
 
6.84 
 
5.55 
 
8.14 
 
0.55 
2000 
 
92 
 
7.42 
 
7.43 
 
6.33 
 
8.37 
 
0.35 
2001 
 
228 
 
6.13 
 
6.23 
 
3.02 
 
8.36 
 
0.87 
2002 
 
256 
 
5.30 
 
5.40 
 
2.18 
 
7.70 
 
1.09 
2003 
 
263 
 
4.03 
 
4.09 
 
-1.34 
 
7.65 
 
1.31 
2004 
 
278 
 
4.31 
 
4.51 
 
1.63 
 
7.36 
 
1.03 
2005 
 
244 
 
4.77 
 
4.83 
 
2.26 
 
8.25 
 
0.60 
2006 
 
244 
 
5.42 
 
5.36 
 
3.96 
 
7.70 
 
0.43 
2007 
 
228 
 
5.44 
 
5.38 
 
4.25 
 
7.84 
 
0.46 
2008 
 
199 
 
5.49 
 
5.24 
 
3.18 
 
13.88 
 
1.35 
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Table 3.3: Linear Panel Regression of Spread on Bank Accounting Ratios 
Dependent variable is the SPREAD measured in percent for each subordinated debt transaction 
by quarter. Estimation method is fixed effects panel estimation, in which each bank is permitted 
to have its own intercept term. Robust standard errors are employed and heteroskedasticity 
consistent t-statistics are reported in parentheses below each coefficient estimate. Fixed effects 
model and explanatory variables are defined as follows: 
                                                                 
                          
NATA represent non-accruing loans to total assets. PDTA represents loans that are greater than 
90 days past due to total assets. OREOTA represents other real estate owned to total assets. 
AGAP is the absolute value of the bank’s one-year maturity gap divided by market value of 
equity. MKTLEV is the market leverage and is constructed as the ratio of book value of total 
liabilities divided by the sum of market value of common stock outstanding and the book value 
of preferred stock. ROA is calculated as net income divided by total assets. Natural log of total 
assets is represented as lnTA. D1995, D1996, … D2007 represent year dummies. ***Significant 
at the 0.01 level **Significant at the 0.05 level *Significant at the 0.10 level. 
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    (1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3)   
    1994 - 2007   1994 - 2001   2002 - 2007   
NATA 
 
0.254 *** 0.239 ** 0.084 
 
  
(2.94) 
 
(2.25) 
 
(0.48) 
 PDTA 
 
-0.246 
 
0.254 
 
-0.201 
 
  
(-1.56) 
 
(0.84) 
 
(-1.02) 
 OREOTA 
 
0.235 
 
0.081 
 
0.320 
 
  
(1.44) 
 
(0.47) 
 
(0.69) 
 AGAP 
 
-0.009 
 
0.053 * -0.209 *** 
  
(-0.32) 
 
(1.85) 
 
(-3.52) 
 MKTLEV 
 
0.039 *** 0.031 ** 0.021 
 
  
(3.88) 
 
(2.55) 
 
(1.07) 
 ROA 
 
-0.2000 *** -0.081 ** -0.379 *** 
  
(-6.16) 
 
(-2.07) 
 
(-8.12) 
 lnTA 
 
-0.145 * 0.099 
 
-0.786 *** 
  
(-1.70) 
 
(1.01) 
 
(-4.41) 
 D1995 
 
-1.470 *** -1.518 *** 
  
  
(-21.36) 
 
(-25.66) 
   D1996 
 
-1.100 *** -1.208 *** 
  
  
(-12.79) 
 
(-15.40) 
   D1997 
 
-1.152 *** -1.249 *** 
  
  
(-11.59) 
 
(-13.31) 
   D1998 
 
-1.433 *** -1.515 *** 
  
  
(-12.99) 
 
(-14.35) 
   D1999 
 
-1.077 *** -1.106 *** 
  
  
(-8.86) 
 
(-9.54) 
   D2000 
 
-1.708 *** -1.819 *** 
  
  
(-12.87) 
 
(-14.03) 
   D2001 
 
-0.783 *** -0.844 *** 
  
  
(-5.69) 
 
(-6.04) 
   D2002 
 
0.540 *** 
    
  
(4.02) 
     D2003 
 
-0.161 
   
-0.667 *** 
  
(-1.19) 
   
(-11.05) 
 D2004 
 
-0.161 
   
-0.726 *** 
  
(-1.09) 
   
(-7.84) 
 D2005 
 
-1.640 *** 
  
-2.078 *** 
  
(-10.26) 
   
(-17.41) 
 D2006 
 
-2.716 *** 
  
-3.198 *** 
  
(-16.18) 
   
(-23.50) 
 D2007 
 
-2.731 *** 
  
-3.211 *** 
  
(-15.23) 
   
(-20.28) 
 Nobs  3030  1577  1453  
R
2
   0.5399   0.4060   0.5212   
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Table 3.4: Cross-section, Linear Regressions of SPREAD on Bank Accounting Ratios 
Dependent variable is the SPREAD measured in percent for each subordinated debt transaction 
by quarter. Estimation method is fixed effects panel estimation, in which each bank is permitted 
to have its own intercept term. Robust standard errors are employed and heteroskedasticity 
consistent t-statistics are reported in parentheses below each coefficient estimate. Fixed effects 
model and explanatory variables are defined as follows: 
                                                          
            
NATA represent non-accruing loans to total assets. PDTA represents loans that are greater than 
90 days past due to total assets. OREOTA represents other real estate owned to total assets. 
AGAP is the absolute value of the bank’s one-year maturity gap divided by market value of 
equity. MKTLEV is the market leverage and is constructed as the ratio of book value of total 
liabilities divided by the sum of market value of common stock outstanding and the book value 
of preferred stock. ROA is calculated as net income divided by total assets. Natural log of total 
assets is represented as lnTA. ***Significant at the 0.01 level **Significant at the 0.05 level 
*Significant at the 0.10 level. 
 
  
 
   1
1
2
 
  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998  1999  2000  2001  
NATA -0.125 0.111 0.421 ** 0.035 -0.037 0.129 -0.62 * 0.989 *** 
 
(-0.61) (0.60) (2.26) (0.19) (-0.13) (0.30) (-1.76) (2.98) 
PDTA 1.787 * 0.728 0.425 0.891 ** 0.646 1.440 *** 0.616 1.416 ** 
 
(1.86) (1.28) (0.71) (2.18) (1.25) (2.80) (0.77) (2.06) 
OREOTA 0.213 -0.598 0.496 -0.488 0.400 1.893 * -1.538 -2.371 
 
(0.73) (-1.44) (1.08) (-1.42) (0.69) (1.89) (-1.48) (-1.59) 
AGAP 0.018 0.063 * 0.106 ** -0.079 -0.006 -0.113 0.217 *** 0.189 
 
(0.52) (1.80) (2.19) (-1.48) (-0.08) (-1.41) (2.78) (1.35) 
MKTLEV -0.021 -0.041 ** 0.031 ** 0.009 0.088 *** 0.054 ** -0.034 0.198 *** 
 
(-0.92) (-2.23) (1.99) (0.71) (4.72) (2.15) (-1.21) (4.35) 
ROA -0.745 *** -0.660 *** 0.061 -0.714 *** 0.555 *** 0.007 -0.487 *** 1.432 *** 
 
(-4.44) (-4.06) (0.50) (-8.52) (4.43) (0.09) (-4.43) (7.52) 
ln(TA) 0.027 0.048 0.038 -0.040 -0.014 -0.058 -0.060 0.114 
 
(0.25) (0.70) (0.75) (-1.06) (-0.24) (-1.23) (-0.76) (1.20) 
Nobs 172 259 244 253 210 135 88  219 
R
2
 0.1462 0.0696  0.0265  0.2328 0.1297 0.1584 0.2093  0.2467 
 
  
  
 
   1
1
3
 
Table 3.4 Continued 
 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
NATA 0.176 -0.025 -1.045 *** -1.050 *** -0.687 *** -0.343 
 
(0.78) (-0.07) (-2.59) (-3.78) (-3.14) (-1.14) 
PDTA 1.544 ** 0.480 -1.280 *** -0.167 0.029 -0.883 *** 
 
(2.29) (0.65) (-3.02) (-0.69) (0.11) (-4.04) 
OREOTA 2.099 ** 3.486 *** 2.442 *** 0.646 0.610 -4.183 *** 
 
(2.32) (3.18) (2.81) (0.37) (0.53) (-5.33) 
AGAP 0.180 0.098 -0.080 0.079 0.057 -0.149 ** 
 
(1.42) (0.68) (-0.50) (0.70) (0.74) (-2.09) 
MKTLEV 0.031 0.089 ** -0.010 -0.126 * 0.025 0.438 *** 
 
(1.12) (2.45) (-0.18) (-1.86) (0.34) (8.86) 
ROA -0.542 *** 0.479 ** -0.921 *** -1.014 *** -0.311 *** -1.454 *** 
 
(-3.18) (1.97) (-4.74) (-10.11) (-5.05) (-13.46) 
ln(TA) -0.222 ** -0.154 -0.338 *** -0.221 *** -0.089 * -0.308 *** 
 
(-2.43) (-1.46) (-3.96) (-3.39) (-1.68) (-5.52) 
Nobs 245 252  266  234 234 219 
R
2
 0.138  0.0486 0.1384 0.3709 0.166 0.649 
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Table 3.5: Subsample of Fixed Effects Regression 2002 – 2007 
Dependent variable is the SPREAD measured in percent for each subordinated debt transaction 
by quarter. Estimation method is fixed effects panel estimation, in which each bank is permitted 
to have its own intercept term. Robust standard errors are employed and heteroskedasticity 
consistent t-statistics are reported in parentheses below each coefficient estimate. Fixed effects 
model and explanatory variables are defined as follows: 
                                                                 
                          
Column 1 regresses only on banks not classified as TBTF. Column 2 regresses only on banks in 
the bottom quartile of banks ranked by High Opaque. Column 3 regresses on banks in the top 
three quartiles of banks ranked by High Opaque. NATA represent non-accruing loans to total 
assets. PDTA represents loans that are greater than 90 days past due to total assets. OREOTA 
represents other real estate owned to total assets. AGAP is the absolute value of the bank’s one-
year maturity gap divided by market value of equity. MKTLEV is the market leverage and is 
constructed as the ratio of book value of total liabilities divided by the sum of market value of 
common stock outstanding and the book value of preferred stock. ROA is calculated as net 
income divided by total assets. Natural log of total assets is represented as lnTA. D1995, D1996, 
… D2007 represent year dummies. ***Significant at the 0.01 level **Significant at the 0.05 
level *Significant at the 0.10 level.  
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    (1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3)   
    Non-TBTF   Least Opaque   More Opaque   
NATA 
 
0.223 
 
0.500 ** 0.600 
 
  
(0.91) 
 
(2.02) 
 
(1.49) 
 PDTA 
 
-0.186 
 
-0.533 
 
0.754 
 
  
(-0.04) 
 
(-1.33) 
 
(0.63) 
 OREOTA 
 
0.089 
 
0.198 ** -0.044 
 
  
(0.10) 
 
(2.43) 
 
(-0.59) 
 AGAP 
 
-0.273 *** -0.078 
 
-0.378 *** 
  
(-2.67) 
 
(-0.79) 
 
(-3.34) 
 MKTLEV 
 
0.126 * 0.137 ** 0.017 
 
  
(1.84) 
 
(2.33) 
 
(0.69) 
 ROA 
 
-0.334 *** -0.228 *** -0.414 *** 
  
(-4.79) 
 
(-2.74) 
 
(-5.38) 
 lnTA 
 
-1.646 *** -0.146 
 
-1.190 *** 
  
(-3.54) 
 
(-0.74) 
 
(-4.15) 
 D2003 
 
-0.568 *** -0.642 *** -0.601 *** 
  
(-5.34) 
 
(-5.42) 
 
(-5.98) 
 D2004 
 
-0.561 *** -0.542 *** -0.508 *** 
  
(-3.87) 
 
(-3.60) 
 
(-3.02) 
 D2005 
 
-1.842 *** -1.978 *** -1.559 *** 
  
(-9.52) 
 
(-10.78) 
 
(-7.35) 
 D2006 
 
-3.186 *** -3.386 *** -2.683 *** 
  
(-14.75) 
 
(-16.92) 
 
(-11.84) 
 D2007 
 
-3.217 *** -3.276 *** -2.696 *** 
  
(-12.87) 
 
(-14.94) 
 
(-10.60) 
 Nobs   419   364   1089   
R
2
   0.3102   0.5335   0.5280   
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Table 3.6: Linear Panel Regression with the Addition of Subordinated Debt Characteristics 
Dependent variable is the SPREAD measured in percent for each subordinated debt transaction 
by quarter. Estimation method is fixed effects panel estimation, in which each bank is permitted 
to have its own intercept term. Robust standard errors are employed and heteroskedasticity 
consistent t-statistics are reported in parentheses below each coefficient estimate. Fixed effects 
model and explanatory variables are defined as follows: 
                                                                 
                                             
NATA represent non-accruing loans to total assets. PDTA represents loans that are greater than 
90 days past due to total assets. OREOTA represents other real estate owned to total assets. 
AGAP is the absolute value of the bank’s one-year maturity gap divided by market value of 
equity. MKTLEV is the market leverage and is constructed as the ratio of book value of total 
liabilities divided by the sum of market value of common stock outstanding and the book value 
of preferred stock. ROA is calculated as net income divided by total assets. Natural log of total 
assets is represented as lnTA. COUPON is the coupon rate of the bank subordinated debt. TTM is 
the time to maturity of the bank subordinated debt in terms of years where partial years are kept 
in decimal form. D1995, D1996, … D2007 represent year dummies. ***Significant at the 0.01 
level **Significant at the 0.05 level *Significant at the 0.10 level. 
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    (1)   (2)   (3)   
    1994 - 2007   1994 - 2001   2002 - 2007   
NATA 
 
0.092 * 0.079 ** 0.081 
 
  
(1.76) 
 
(2.25) 
 
(0.84) 
 PDTA 
 
-0.192 
 
0.029 
 
-0.323 *** 
  
(-1.39) 
 
(0.17) 
 
(-3.18) 
 OREOTA 
 
0.012 
 
0.109 
 
0.065 
 
  
(0.10) 
 
(0.94) 
 
(0.21) 
 AGAP 
 
0.012 
 
0.030 ** -0.020 
 
  
(0.78) 
 
(2.06) 
 
(-0.52) 
 MKTLEV 
 
0.012 * 0.016 * 0.022 
 
  
(2.17) 
 
(1.87) 
 
(1.02) 
 ROA 
 
-0.152 *** -0.064 * -0.247 *** 
  
(-4.58) 
 
(-1.70) 
 
(-4.59) 
 lnTA 
 
-0.032 ** -0.055 
 
-0.036 *** 
  
(-2.34) 
 
(-1.47) 
 
(3.06) 
 COUPON 
 
0.213 *** 0.270 *** 0.148 *** 
  
(18.01) 
 
(19.26) 
 
(7.85) 
 TTM 
 
0.077 *** 0.052 *** 0.105 *** 
  
(31.52) 
 
(18.29) 
 
(26.50) 
 D1995 
 
-1.549 *** -1.557 *** 
  
  
(-23.14) 
 
(-28.28) 
   D1996 
 
-1.180 *** -1.183 *** 
  
  
(-16.01) 
 
(-19.01) 
   D1997 
 
-1.221 *** -1.207 *** 
  
  
(-15.42) 
 
(-17.55) 
   D1998 
 
-1.458 *** -1.422 *** 
  
  
(-17.16) 
 
(-19.10) 
   D1999 
 
-0.994 *** -0.927 *** 
  
  
(-10.65) 
 
(-11.44) 
   D2000 
 
-1.562 *** -1.503 *** 
  
  
(-15.42) 
 
(-17.16) 
   D2001 
 
-0.558 *** -0.481 *** 
  
  
(-5.86) 
 
(-5.69) 
   D2002 
 
0.918 *** 
    
  
(10.56) 
     D2003 
 
0.350 *** 
  
-0.562 *** 
  
(4.09) 
   
(-8.27) 
 D2004 
 
0.468 *** 
  
-0.489 *** 
  
(5.25) 
   
(-6.36) 
 D2005 
 
-0.821 *** 
  
-1.797 *** 
  
(-8.88) 
   
(-20.95) 
 D2006 
 
-1.825 *** 
  
-2.830 *** 
  
(-19.53) 
   
(-33.02) 
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D2007 
 
-1.762 *** 
  
-2.811 *** 
  
(-17.67) 
   
(-30.16) 
 Nobs   3030   1577   1453   
R
2
   0.6587   0.6053   0.7593   
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Table 3.7: Linear Panel Regression of Spread on Alternative Measure of Loan Quality 
Dependent variable is the SPREAD measured in percent for each subordinated debt transaction 
by quarter. Estimation method is fixed effects panel estimation, in which each bank is permitted 
to have its own intercept term. Robust standard errors are employed and heteroskedasticity 
consistent t-statistics are reported in parentheses below each coefficient estimate. Fixed effects 
model and explanatory variables are defined as follows: 
                                                                   
     
ALLTA represent net allowance for loans and lease losses to total assets. PDTA represents loans 
that are greater than 90 days past due to total assets. OREOTA represents other real estate owned 
to total assets. AGAP is the absolute value of the bank’s one-year maturity gap divided by market 
value of equity. MKTLEV is the market leverage and is constructed as the ratio of book value of 
total liabilities divided by the sum of market value of common stock outstanding and the book 
value of preferred stock. ROA is calculated as net income divided by total assets. Natural log of 
total assets is represented as lnTA. D1995, D1996, … D2007 represent year dummies. 
***Significant at the 0.01 level **Significant at the 0.05 level *Significant at the 0.10 level.  
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    (1)   (2)   (3)   
    1994 - 2007   1994 - 2001   2002 - 2007   
ALLTA 
 
-0.122 
 
0.164 
 
-0.600 *** 
  
(-1.10) 
 
(1.19) 
 
(-3.50) 
 AGAP 
 
-0.007 
 
0.051 * -0.180 *** 
  
(-0.25) 
 
(1.88) 
 
(-3.19) 
 MKTLEV 
 
0.043 *** 0.036 *** 0.020 
 
  
(4.32) 
 
(3.16) 
 
(1.19) 
 ROA 
 
-0.200 *** -0.131 *** -0.252 *** 
  
(-4.95) 
 
(-2.65) 
 
(-4.24) 
 lnTA 
 
-0.176 ** 0.043 
 
-0.661 *** 
  
(-2.08) 
 
(0.45) 
 
(-3.73) 
 D1995 
 
-1.565 *** -1.576 *** 
  
  
(-24.99) 
 
(-29.72) 
   D1996 
 
-1.225 *** -1.288 *** 
  
  
(-15.69) 
 
(-17.69) 
   D1997 
 
-1.306 *** -1.360 *** 
  
  
(-14.49) 
 
(-15.58) 
   D1998 
 
-1.595 *** -1.623 *** 
  
  
(-15.88) 
 
(-16.33) 
   D1999 
 
-1.210 *** -1.184 *** 
  
  
(-10.68) 
 
(-10.63) 
   D2000 
 
-1.801 *** -1.894 *** 
  
  
(-14.42) 
 
(-15.26) 
   D2001 
 
-0.838 *** -0.875 *** 
  
  
(-6.49) 
 
(-6.56) 
   D2002 
 
0.544 *** 
    
  
(4.33) 
     D2003 
 
-0.205 
   
-0.764 *** 
  
(-1.60) 
   
(-12.87) 
 D2004 
 
-0.263 * 
  
-0.899 *** 
  
(-1.84) 
   
(-11.30) 
 D2005 
 
-1.763 *** 
  
-2.286 *** 
  
(-11.37) 
   
(-22.37) 
 D2006 
 
-2.852 *** 
  
-3.434 *** 
  
(-17.55) 
   
(-29.09) 
 D2007 
 
-2.861 *** 
  
-3.427 *** 
  
(-16.52) 
   
(-25.01) 
 Nobs   3030   1577   1453   
R
2
   0.5414   0.4137   0.5418   
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Table 3.8: Linear Panel Regression of Spread on Four Measures of Loan Quality 
Dependent variable is the SPREAD measured in percent for each subordinated debt transaction 
by quarter. Estimation method is fixed effects panel estimation, in which each bank is permitted 
to have its own intercept term. Robust standard errors are employed and heteroskedasticity 
consistent t-statistics are reported in parentheses below each coefficient estimate. Fixed effects 
model and explanatory variables are defined as follows: 
                                                        
                                             
NATA represent non-accruing loans to total assets. PDTA represents loans that are greater than 
90 days past due to total assets. OREOTA represents other real estate owned to total assets. 
ALLTA represent net allowance for loans and lease losses to total assets. PDTA represents loans 
that are greater than 90 days past due to total assets. OREOTA represents other real estate owned 
to total assets. AGAP is the absolute value of the bank’s one-year maturity gap divided by market 
value of equity. MKTLEV is the market leverage and is constructed as the ratio of book value of 
total liabilities divided by the sum of market value of common stock outstanding and the book 
value of preferred stock. ROA is calculated as net income divided by total assets. Natural log of 
total assets is represented as lnTA. D1995, D1996, … D2007 represent year dummies. 
***Significant at the 0.01 level **Significant at the 0.05 level *Significant at the 0.10 level.  
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    (1)   (2)   (3)   
    1994 - 2007   1994 - 2001   2002 - 2007   
NATA 
 
0.300 *** 0.230 ** 0.269 
 
  
(3.34) 
 
(2.16) 
 
(1.50) 
 PDTA 
 
-0.225 
 
0.225 
 
-0.114 
 
  
(-1.42) 
 
(0.75) 
 
(-0.58) 
 OREOTA 
 
0.190 
 
0.105 
 
0.388 
 
  
(1.15) 
 
(0.60) 
 
(0.85) 
 ALLTA 
 
-0.212 * 0.144 
 
-0.681 *** 
  
(-1.82) 
 
(1.04) 
 
(-3.72) 
 AGAP 
 
-0.008 
 
0.054 * -0.199 *** 
  
(-0.29) 
 
(1.90) 
 
(-3.37) 
 MKTLEV 
 
0.039 *** 0.030 ** 0.028 
 
  
(3.96) 
 
(2.46) 
 
(1.43) 
 ROA 
 
-0.151 *** -0.113 ** -0.219 *** 
  
(-3.56) 
 
(-2.26) 
 
(-3.45) 
 lnTA 
 
-0.131 
 
0.093 
 
-0.625 *** 
  
(-1.53) 
 
(0.94) 
 
(-3.42) 
 D1995 
 
-1.466 *** -1.517 *** 
  
  
(-21.30) 
 
(-25.64) 
   D1996 
 
-1.084 *** -1.213 *** 
  
  
(-12.53) 
 
(-15.43) 
   D1997 
 
-1.130 *** -1.255 *** 
  
  
(-11.29) 
 
(-13.35) 
   D1998 
 
-1.415 *** -1.518 *** 
  
  
(-12.77) 
 
(-14.38) 
   D1999 
 
-1.065 *** -1.105 *** 
  
  
(-8.75) 
 
(-9.53) 
   D2000 
 
-1.682 *** -1.832 *** 
  
  
(-12.61) 
 
(-14.07) 
   D2001 
 
-0.764 *** -0.854 *** 
  
  
(-5.54) 
 
(-6.09) 
   D2002 
 
0.571 *** 
    
  
(4.22) 
     D2003 
 
-0.150 
   
-0.739 *** 
  
(-1.11) 
   
(-11.71) 
 D2004 
 
-0.158 
   
-0.830 *** 
  
(-1.07) 
   
(-8.63) 
 D2005 
 
-1.636 *** 
  
-2.201 *** 
  
(-10.23) 
   
(-17.85) 
 D2006 
 
-2.721 *** 
  
-3.358 *** 
  
(-16.21) 
   
(-23.64) 
 D2007 
 
-2.729 *** 
  
-3.368 *** 
  
(-15.23) 
   
(-20.65) 
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Nobs   3030   1577   1453   
R
2
   0.5402   0.4062   0.5523   
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OVERALL CONCLUSIONS 
 In my first essay, I find that direct foreign investors move firms away from a Swedish 
stakeholder orientation toward an Anglo-American shareholder wealth maximization focus.  
Foreign shareholders as opposed to domestic shareholders are agents of change because they 
push Swedish firms to behave more in accordance with what is the accepted goal of a 
corporation within the Anglo-American cultural context. We find that these corporations increase 
both capital intensity and labor productivity primarily by cutting unproductive portions of labor 
and shifting towards more efficient uses of capital.   
 In my second essay, I find that strong formal institutions foster better efficiency and 
outreach while strong informal institutions’ impact is limited to better outreach.  Overall, strong 
formal and informal institutions help support MFIs and also mitigate the potential of mission 
drift.   Because MFIs’ goals are not usually profit maximization but rather sustainability and 
outreach, these results indicate that strong formal and informal institutions help minimize 
principle-agency problems.   
 In my third essay, I investigate the apparent lack of market discipline in the bank 
subordinated debt market leading up to the 2008 finance crisis. I find that subordinated debt 
holders were caught off guard by the suddenness and magnitude of the crisis. I find that bank 
opacity created a vulnerable environment in the banking industry that contributed to this 
collapse.  Subordinated bond holders, as well as regulators and credit agencies failed to 
accurately gauge the level of risk within the banking industry.  Here we find that opacity, or a 
lack of transparency made market discipline ineffective.  I conclude that regulators and policy 
makers must act to ensure transparency to allow markets to function properly.  Once again, a 
lack of good formal institutions (regulations and enforcement in the banking industry) 
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contributed to a lack of corporate governance. 
 Overall, I find that beyond internal matters of corporate governance, external sources 
of corporate governance can have a real impact on the financial outcome of firms.  The impact of 
formal and informal institutions and agents who challenge these institutions should not be 
dismissed. By looking beyond the traditional principle-agent conflict and its impact on firm 
performance, I offer a richer landscape of corporate governance. 
 
